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THE “NEXUS” APPROACH UNDER TITLE III OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT FOR HEAVILY 
INTEGRATED BUT SEPARATELY OWNED WEBSITES AND 
“PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION” 
Mark Keddis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Hurricane Sandy left millions of households and 
commercial entities disconnected from the Internet in the midst of 
overwhelming power outages.1  Loss of access to the World Wide Web 
is a significant hindrance today given society’s increased reliance on 
technology.2  But each and every day, countless individuals like Karen 
Beth Young constantly face their own version of inaccessibility for 
another reason—the Internet is an imperfect technology that is often 
at odds with their particular disabilities.3  While the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) is a vital tool for combating disability 
discrimination,4 “Title III has been less successful than was originally 
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       1 Joe Van Brussel, Hurricane Sandy Power Outages Send New Yorkers Streaming North 
in Search of Current, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2012, 7:04 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/hurricane-sandy-power-outages-new 
-yorkers_n_2046187.html. 
 2  Stephanie Khouri, Welcome to the New Town Square of Today’s Global Village: 
Website Accessibility for Individuals with Disabilities after Target and the 2008 Amendments 
to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 331, 342 (2010) 
(“In today’s society, it is hard to imagine a world without the Internet.”); Rick 
Newman, 10 Things We Can’t Live Without, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 18, 2010, 
5:35 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2010/05/18/10 
-things-we-cant-live-without (“In a Pew Research Center survey from last year, high-
speed Internet was one of only three things people said was more of a necessity in 
2009 than in 2006.”). 
 3  See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 4  LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING 
DISABILITY RIGHTS 299 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2003) (“The ADA creates an expansive 
antidiscrimination mandate.”). 
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hoped.”5  Congress and the courts have been unable to agree on a 
standard for determining Title III’s applicability to the Internet at a 
time where litigation involving web-based businesses is on the rise, 
demonstrating Title III’s fragility.6 
Differing interpretations of the statutory language itself fuel the 
uncertainty surrounding Title III’s applicability to the Internet.7  Title 
III aims to prevent discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 
operates a place of public accommodation.”8  Courts specifically 
disagree as to whether the term “place of public accommodation” 
includes virtual spaces that affect commerce9 and at what point, if at 
all, a website becomes a service of a place of public accommodation.10 
Courts must resolve such questions in order to implement Title 
III’s purpose—to ensure access to places of public accommodation—
because, for some disabled persons, closing a virtual door may have 
the effect of completely denying access to the accommodation.11  The 
 
 5  Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
377, 379 (2000). 
 6  WILLIAM D. GOREN, UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 131 
(Am. Bar Ass’n, 3d Ed. 2010) (“The question of how Title III of the ADA applies to 
the Internet is not going to go away, especially as e-commerce takes over all of our 
lives.” ); see also infra note 95 and accompanying text.  Compare Nat’l Fed’n of the 
Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding Title III 
applicable to inaccessible website as a service of a place of public accommodation), 
with Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 
2002) (finding Title III not applicable to inaccessible website as a place of public 
accommodation itself due to its virtual, as opposed to physical, nature). 
 7  See generally Jonathan R. Mook, Mook on the ADAs Application to the Internet, 2008 
EMERGING ISSUES 1780 (2008) (discussing the development of case law regarding 
Title III’s applicability to the Internet and comparing various court interpretations of 
Title III’s statutory language from such cases). 
 8  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006). 
 9  Under Title III, a public accommodation is a private entity whose operations 
affect commerce.  Id. § 12181(7). 
 10  E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946. 
 11  MARGARET C. JASPER, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 25 (Oceana Publ’ns 
1998) (“Businesses which have more than one public entrance must provide at least 
one accessible entrance during business hours.”); Colker, supra note 5, at 402 
(emphasis added) (“The purpose of ADA Title III, however, was to remedy the lack of 
access to places of public accommodation by individuals with disabilities.”); Ryan 
Campbell Richards, Current Issues in Public Policy: Reconciling the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Commercial Websites: A Feasible Solution?, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
520, 522 (2010) (“The Americans with Disabilities Act requires universal access to 
places of public accommodation and their respective services.”).  A retailer with an 
inaccessible website may indeed close all doors to a disabled consumer who is 
attempting to make purchases when the physical entrance to a brick-and-mortar 
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ADA strives to address day-to-day discrimination and integrate the 
disabled into the “economic and social mainstream.”12  Commerce, 
however, has evolved concurrently with technology, such that the 
Internet is now the most pervasive method of communication for 
both social networking and business.13  Therefore, courts must settle 
the issue of Title III’s applicability to the Internet in order to ensure 
that the way in which an entity engages in commerce does not 
determine whether a disabled customer can access its goods and 
services.14 
Over the years, courts have developed a plethora of case law 
 
store is closed.  Khouri, supra note 2 (“It is clear the retail industry relies a great deal 
on its websites.”).  There is a question as to what may constitute business hours when 
a retailer has a website because consumers can make purchases on a retailer’s website 
at all hours of the day.  Id.  Courts must resolve the questions surrounding Title III’s 
applicability to the Internet because the ADA is an important—and often the only—
avenue of relief for disabled individuals.  Colker, supra note 5, at 380 (“Although 
state law can sometimes serve as a remedial gap filler . . . that result has not occurred 
under ADA Title III.”). 
 12  H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
381; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006) (“It is the purpose of this Act to provide a clear 
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”); Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 
787, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[The ADA] is to be accorded a liberal construction in 
order to carry out the purposes of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, 
unfairness and humiliation of . . . discrimination.”).  There is also a significant public 
policy consideration that exemplifies the ADA’s mandate for adequate 
communication capacity.  Martin v. Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 225 F. Supp. 
2d 1362, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (emphasis added) (“The ADA embodies a national 
policy that encourages self-reliance and self-sufficiency.”).  While Martin is a Title II case, 
the court clearly saw a need to require better accommodations to the public.  See id. 
 13  See supra note 2.  Facebook is a prime example of a dominant method of 
communication today for social networking and also for commerce—now with its 
own “virtual currency.”  See infra notes 29, 102.  While Facebook’s social networking 
platform is the primary driving force behind its stellar reputation, the company now 
profits from advertising and from selling its “Facebook Credits.”  See discussion infra 
Part II.D.2.  There is a question as to whether, for Title III purposes, a website with 
social influence carries the same weight as one with commercial influence; the 
answer is that Facebook penetrates both virtual and physical walls and therefore at 
least warrants the consideration that it is significant enough to come under Title III’s 
reach.  See Facebook Info. Mission Statement, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com 
/facebook?sk=info (last visited Jan. 27, 2012) (“Facebook’s mission is to give people 
the power to share and make the world more open and connected.”). 
 14  The term “commerce” includes “communications.”  § 12181(1).  Title III 
prevents the escape of liability “through contractual, licensing, or other 
arrangements,” and “prohibit[s] a public accommodation [from] doing indirectly 
through a contractual relationship what it may not do directly.”  Id. § 
12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (alteration in original).  Facebook could be an example of a 
virtual entity that attempts to escape liability because it authorizes retail stores to sell 
gift cards that purchasers can only use on its website.  See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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regarding Title III’s applicability to the Internet with two prominent 
arguments ultimately emerging.15  The first—and more hotly 
contested—argument is that the Internet is a place of public 
accommodation irrespective of its virtual nature because its 
operations often affect commerce.16  Courts, however, disagree as to 
whether Title III’s public-accommodation provision is limited in its 
coverage to only physical places; this debate is currently unresolved.17  
This Comment will not address that issue, and will therefore define a 
place of public accommodation as a “place” in the physical sense.18 
The second argument—this Comment’s focal point—is an 
alternative to the first that involves the application of the “nexus” 
approach to websites.19  Under this argument, a plaintiff can 
 
 15  E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (considering whether a website 
can be a service of a place of public accommodation); Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest 
Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (considering whether a website 
can itself be a place of public accommodation). 
 16  E.g., Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (plaintiff arguing southwest.com itself to 
be a place of public accommodation because it is a virtual space whose operations 
affect commerce); see also Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 
F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 
37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 17  § 12181(7).  Compare Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19 (placing weight on the fact that 
Title III’s drafters included “travel services” among the enumerated list of public 
accommodations along with “service establishments,” demonstrating the inclusion of 
service providers that do not require the physical presence of a consumer), and Nat’l 
Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-CV-30168, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84518, at 
*9–11 (D. Mass. June 19, 2012) (relying on Carparts and finding a “Watch Instantly” 
video–streaming website to be a Title III place of public accommodation as either a 
service establishment, place of entertainment, or a rental establishment that provides 
services in the home), with Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (finding congressional 
intent to be clear that Title III governs only physical places of public accommodation 
given the comprehensive definition of a public accommodation).  This Comment 
may utilize certain aspects of this argument, when appropriate, to further the 
question presented.  For an overview of the debate between physical and virtual 
places under Title III, see generally Jeffrey Bashaw, Applying the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to Private Websites after National Federation of the Blind v. Target, 4 
SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH 3 (2008); Isabel Arana DuPree, Websites as “Places of Public 
Accommodation”: Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Wake of National 
Federation of the Blind v. Target Corporation, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 273 (2007). 
 18  Both the Northern District of California and the Southern District of Florida 
have declared that a place of public accommodation must be a physical structure.  
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Earll v. eBay, Inc., 
No. 5:11-cv-00262-JF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100360 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011); Nat’l 
Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946; Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312. 
 19  Plaintiffs can use the “nexus” argument as an alternative route because it does 
not ask whether the Internet itself is a public accommodation.  E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the 
Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946.  While some legal scholars advocate for different 
approaches to determine Title III’s applicability to the Internet, this Comment will 
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demonstrate a violation of the ADA on the basis of unequal access to 
services by establishing a “nexus” between the challenged service and 
a place of public accommodation.20  National Federation of the Blind v. 
Target Corp. is the seminal case that extends this approach to 
websites.21  Target represents the scenario of a single entity that owns 
two spaces—one virtual and one physical—where the former is 
noncompliant with ADA standards while the later is compliant with 
such standards.22  The Target court’s ruling establishes that an 
inaccessible website can be a service of a place of public 
accommodation if it is “heavily integrated” with, or acts as a gateway 
to, the place.23  The term “integration” is a source of lucidity because 
 
not address such arguments.  For an analysis of the efficiency of such proposals, 
compare Nikki D. Kessling, Why the Target “Nexus Test” Leaves Disabled Americans 
Disconnected: A Better Approach to Determine Whether Private Commercial Websites are “Places 
of Public Accommodation,” 45 HOUS L. REV. 991 (2008), with Richard E. Moberly, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the “Nexus” Approach to Private 
Internet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963 (2004). 
 20  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 952.  The “nexus” approach applies 
Title III to intangible barriers pursuant to the language “services of,” as opposed to 
“services in,” a place of public accommodation.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).  A 
plaintiff seeking to establish a Title III claim must also generally establish three 
elements.  Id.; Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008).  The first 
is the demonstration of a disability within the meaning of the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2)(A) (2006) (“The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual, a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual.”).  The second, and most relevant for this Comment’s 
purpose, is that the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public 
accommodation.  § 12182(a).  The third is that the defendant created discriminatory 
conditions through the denial of the full and equal opportunity to enjoy or 
participate in the services it provides.  Id.; Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 
F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949. 
 21  452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006); 4 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE & 
INTERNET LAW: TREATISE WITH FORMS § 48.06[4] (2d ed. Supp. 2011), available at 
Westlaw ECOMMINTLAW (“Although Target Corp. was merely a district court 
decision . . . the case nonetheless has sparked similar suits in the Northern District of 
California and been influential in encouraging companies to make their sites 
accessible to disabled users.”); see also discussion infra Part II.B.  While Access Now 
came before Target, it did not extend application of the “nexus” approach to 
websites; rather, Access Now is a critical decision for determining whether the Internet 
itself can be a place of public accommodation.  See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest 
Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004) (plaintiffs raising “nexus” 
argument for the first time on appeal, and, thus, preventing the court from 
considering the argument due to its limited scope of review); see also discussion infra 
Part II.A.3. 
 22  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949–950.  Before cases like Target, 
Title III litigation typically involved only one space—a noncompliant physical place 
of public accommodation.  See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 23  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954–55.  Websites create a form of 
intangible discrimination, meaning that the website either creates a separate benefit 
for those able to access it, or prevents enjoyment or usage, of the goods or services of 
KEDDIS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2013  4:14 PM 
848 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:843 
it allows Title III liability to reach noncompliant virtual spaces that act 
as a doorway to a physical space.24  But, at the same time, the term is 
also a source of confusion because the court did not provide concrete 
instructions for applying the “nexus” approach to future Internet 
cases.25 
While Target allowed Title III to reach a noncompliant virtual 
space that the retailer owned and operated, the court did not 
anticipate that a noncompliant virtual space may well be integrated 
with a separately owned compliant physical space26—until recently.27  In 
2011, Karen Beth Young presented the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California, the same jurisdiction that 
decided Target, with an opportunity to revisit the “nexus” approach in 
such a situation.28  Young, a disabled individual, brought a Title III 
claim against Facebook, Inc. alleging that the company unlawfully 
deactivated her account and prevented her from interacting with 
society using the most pervasive method of communication today—
facebook.com.29  She was so adamant to resolve her dilemma that she 
drove from her home in Maryland to Facebook’s headquarters in 
 
a place of public accommodation.  § 12182(a), (b)(1)(A). 
 24  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 956; see discussion infra Part II.B. 
 25  DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91; see also discussion infra Part II.C. 
 26  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949.  The Target court came close to 
recognizing such a scenario when it allowed Title III to reach a noncompliant virtual 
space that acted as a “door” to a compliant physical place of public accommodation; 
however, the critical difference is that Target Corp. had unitary ownership and 
control of both spaces.  Id. (“Target.com is a website owned and operated by 
Target.”); see also infra Figure 1.  This distinction is important because while the 
“nexus” approach and the term “integration” are judicially created mechanisms, Title 
III still statutorily requires a defendant to have some form of ownership, leasing, or 
operation of a place of public accommodation.  § 12182(a). 
 27  The Young court may have had this exact scenario before it; however, the 
court dismissed the claim without assessing the merits of the “nexus” argument.  
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  This 
scenario has continued to recur throughout the years 2011 and into 2012, resulting 
in ongoing Title III litigation.  See infra note 95 and accompanying text; discussion 
infra Part II.E. 
 28  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.  The great majority—or possibly the totality—
of Title III cases implicating questions of ownership, leasing, or operation have not 
involved the Internet and the application of the “nexus” approach.  See infra note 36.  
Prior to Young, Title III website cases did not implicate issues of ownership.  E.g., 
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (“Target.com is a website owned and 
operated by Target.”). 
 29  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1114–16; see also Jessica Guynn, Facebook  Hits 1 Billion 
Users, Reaching Historic Milestone, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/04/business/la-fi-tn-facebook-hits-historic 
-milestone-1-billion-users-20121004 (“Facebook has hit the biggest milestone in the 
company’s eight-year history: 1 billion users.”). 
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California, and then appeared pro se in her Title III suit against the 
billion-dollar company.30  Young argued that a “nexus” existed 
between the noncompliant Facebook website and various compliant 
brick-and-mortar stores because Facebook advertised and provided its 
gift cards, which purchasers could only redeem online for the virtual 
currency “Facebook Credits,” through such stores.31  Ultimately, the 
court dismissed the claim without reaching the merits of this 
‘integration’ argument because the plaintiff had not asserted 
Facebook’s ownership, leasing, or operation of a place of public 
accommodation.32 
Young, however, sets the stage for this Comment’s question 
presented: can a “nexus” exist under Title III of the ADA between a 
noncompliant website and a separately owned place of public 
accommodation when the website and the physical space are heavily 
integrated, and the website’s inaccessibility prevents full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods its company provides through that physical 
place?33  This question remains important because Title III litigation 
 
 30  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.  It is quite likely that Young’s pro se status 
played a factor in the court’s dismissal of her Title III claim because she “failed to 
assert” a particular argument.  Id. at 1116.  Studies have shown that plaintiffs are 
bringing meritorious Title III claims, but pro se litigants appear to be disadvantaged 
as they lack the required legal knowledge and resources to pursue such actions.  E.g., 
Jaime A. Eagan, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Empirical Look at U.S. District 
Court Litigation Involving Government Services and Public Accommodations Claims (June 
23, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1870601 (2007 study of U.S. District 
Court ADA litigation showing that while 11% of such suits are brought by pro se 
litigants, over half of those were dismissed without meaningful adjudication because 
pro se plaintiffs lacked the “legal knowledge and resources to assist them in properly 
serving litigation forms”).  The Target plaintiffs were more fortunate because 
advocacy organizations and their counselors are generally much more successful in 
such suits.  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 948.  This disparity in Title III 
litigation results demonstrates the need to protect pro se plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Young, 
790 F. Supp. 2d 1110. 
 31  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1114; Am. Compl. for Injunctive Relief and Damages 
for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., Cal. 
Disabled Person Act, Cal. Civ. Code 54 et seq., Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Negligence at 2, 5, Young v. 
Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 5:10-cv-03579-JF/PVT), 
2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 7820, at *2–3, 9 (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter 
Amended Complaint]. 
 32  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
 33  Courts have traditionally applied the “nexus” approach to a retailer that owns 
and operates a website as opposed to a web-based retailer.  Michael P. Anderson, 
Ensuring Equal Access to the Internet for the Elderly: The Need to Amend Title III of the ADA, 
19 ELDER L.J. 159, 180 (2011) (alteration in original) (“[T]he ‘nexus’ test applies 
Title III of the ADA only to a website insomuch as it denies one the full use and 
enjoyment of a brick-and-mortar store, thereby leaving out large web-only retail 
websites . . . .”).  This Comment examines a scenario similar to Target whereby a 
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continues to persist against major web-based companies like Netflix 
in 201134 and Redbox in 2012.35  In some ways, this question is a 
modern twist on an old problem because courts have previously 
extended Title III liability for a noncompliant physical space to a 
non-owning entity through “operation”—a required but undefined 
term under the ADA.36  But web-based companies create a unique 
form of discrimination where a virtual space’s noncompliance can 
penetrate a store’s once insurmountable bricks and mortar37—even if 
separately owned.38  Like the term “discrimination,” the word “place” 
is a term of art that should embrace distinctive theories, such as 
defining a company’s “operation” of a place in such a way to reflect 
the existence of web-based entities—many of which have a physical 
 
physical space is compliant but a virtual space is noncompliant; however, this 
Comment deviates from Target in that each space is separately owned but appears to 
be heavily integrated. 
 34  See infra note 95. 
 35  Vic Lee, Redbox Sued Over Access for Visually Impaired, AMERICAN BROADCASTING 
COMPANY (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section 
=news/business&id=8503401; see discussion infra Part II.E. 
 36  E.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 665 (2001) (finding Title III 
applicable to four-day golf tours operated on golf courses that third parties own); 
Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 874 (9th Cir. 
2004) (finding private groups staging a rodeo in a publicly owned arena for a limited 
time to be “operators” of the arena under Title III); see also infra Figure 1.  Although 
Title III requires “operation,” the ADA has not assigned an explicit meaning to the 
term.  Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995); Dahlberg 
v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1102 (D. Colo. 2000); see also 
KRIEGER, supra note 4, at 299 (“Many key definitions in the act are left open-ended.”).  
Lack of a definition has forced courts to scrutinize specific facts of each case to 
determine whether the particular defendant is an operator.  See, e.g., Pickern v. Pier 1 
Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining whether store 
owner was “operator” of a grassy strip and sidewalk that the city owned); Disabled 
Rights Action Comm., 375 F.3d at 878; Neff, 58 F.3d at 1066 (determining whether 
franchisor retained sufficient control over franchisee ice cream stores to be an 
“operator” under Title III); Dahlberg, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (determining whether 
car-rental company operated facility during the time of the alleged discriminatory 
conduct); United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Ky. 1998) 
(determining whether franchisor was an “operator” for failure to make necessary 
hotel repairs); Reed v. YMCA USA, No. 3:07-0765, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119311 
(M.D. Tenn. July 22, 2008) (deciding whether franchisor exercised enough control 
over franchisees by examining organization documents and involvement in wrongful 
conduct). 
 37  E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (finding retailer-companion website’s inaccessibility to affect  blind customers’ 
ability to print out coupons for store usage, order photos for store pick-up, or access 
information on different store locations). 
 38  E.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (plaintiff 
alleging that Facebook membership account deactivation affected her ability to 
redeem the value of Facebook Credit gift cards that consumers can purchase in 
brick-and-mortar retail stores). 
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presence in a place of public accommodation.39  Indeed, several web-
based companies like Redbox have developed a physical presence in 
separately owned brick-and-mortar retail stores by offering their 
products or services through a specific part of the stores—like a 
kiosk.40  These companies’ websites create a separate benefit, for 
those able to access it, or prevent full enjoyment of the goods and 
services that such companies offer through places of public 
accommodation—even when separately owned.41  Therefore, courts 
should construct a definition for the term “operates” to allow for the 
extension of the “nexus” approach to web-based entities in order to 
avoid new analytical difficulties under Title III.42 
To provide an answer to the question presented, this Comment 
will discuss how courts should define the concepts of “integration” 
and “operation,” and the weight that courts should place on them 
when analyzing the sufficiency of a proposed “nexus” test in Title III 
website litigation.  This Comment proposes the “Backdoor Nexus”, 
which is a two-fold approach.43  First, courts should utilize a totality of 
the circumstances method, including the Target factors, to define the 
minimum degree of “integration” that the “nexus” approach requires 
between a website and a public accommodation.44  Second, courts 
 
 39  TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL ANROW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, 
EMPLOYMENT LAW PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 509 (Aspen Publishers, 2d 
Ed. 2011) (“Indeed, discrimination is a term of art that embraces several different 
definitions, each with its own distinctive theory and methods of proof.”).  Another 
related concern is how much courts should actually emphasize this “operation” 
element in cases where the disabled plaintiff is seeking to mandate an inaccessible 
website’s compliance with Title III by establishing a “nexus” to a public 
accommodation—especially when common ownership is lacking.  See, e.g., Young, 790 
F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
 40  Media Center Facts About Redbox, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/facts (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2012) (alteration in original) (“More than 68 percent of the U.S. 
population [lives] within a five-minute drive of a Redbox kiosk . . . .”); see also infra 
note 165; discussion infra Part II.E. 
 41  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 42  See, e.g., Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110; see also discussion infra Part III.A. 
 43  The Comment has elected to use the name “Backdoor Nexus” for two reasons.  
First, a physical door to a brick-and-mortar store and a heavily integrated companion 
website, like target.com, are the indisputable ways in which the owner of the 
establishment desires its customers to access the store.  A separately owned website 
that nonetheless affects the goods or services within a brick-and-mortar store can act 
as a doorway, but the establishment owner neither controls the site nor anticipates its 
customers to use it; hence, the site is a backdoor.  Second, the term “backdoor” in a 
computer system refers to a method in which the user attempts to bypass normal 
authentication while trying to remain undetected—something fitting for the Internet 
context. 
 44  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 946, 949 (N.D. Cal. 
2006); see discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
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should define the term “operates”—or re-interpret Title III’s public-
accommodation provision—such that a web-based company with a 
physical presence in a separately owned place of public 
accommodation can operate that place for Title III purposes.45  The 
“Backdoor Nexus” approach will ultimately draw a firm distinction 
between companies like Facebook with only a virtual presence, which 
do not satisfy the approach, and companies like Redbox with a 
physical presence in a place of public accommodation, which do 
satisfy the approach.46 
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of “integration” 
and the “nexus” approach, including a discussion of the similarities 
between Target and Young and the potential complications of 
applying the “nexus” approach to a business entity like Redbox.  Part 
III will examine the ways that courts have defined the term 
“operation” in other contexts in order to set out the concepts that the 
“Backdoor Nexus” approach incorporates, as well as the approach’s 
framework itself.  Part IV will illustrate the framework’s application 
using the business structures of Target, Redbox,47 and Young.48  Part V 
will conclude. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF “INTEGRATION” AND THE “NEXUS” APPROACH 
This section will examine the “nexus” approach’s development, 
specifically “integration,” beginning with early decisions applying it in 
other contexts.  A discussion of Target’s extension of the approach to 
websites and the resulting ambiguities will follow, as well as an 
assessment of Young, the potential ramifications of a 2012 Redbox 
Title III suit, and the reasons that courts must address “integration” 
in Title III website litigations. 
A.  The “Nexus” Approach Before Target 
While National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp. was the 
 
 45  See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).  The Supreme Court has argued for liberal 
construction of public accommodations under the ADA.  Leah Poynter, Setting the 
Standard: Section 508 Could Have an Impact on Private Sector Web Sites Through the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1197, 1222  (2003).  This 
Comment’s proposed solution will consider whether an entity can operate a 
separately owned place of public accommodation based on its presence in that place, 
or the fact that it offers services through that place.  See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 46  See discussion infra Parts IV.B–C, V. 
 47  Redbox is a seminal example of a scenario involving a web-based company 
with a physical presence in a separately owned place of public accommodation.  See 
discussion infra Parts II.E, IV.B. 
 48  Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
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landmark case that extended the “nexus” approach to websites, a 
number of important decisions preceding it were critical in shaping 
the analysis.49 
1.  Sufficiency of “Integration” under Stoutenborough 
In 1995, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a “nexus” existed 
between televised broadcasts of National Football League (NFL) 
games, which the NFL blacked out when fan attendance was below a 
certain level, and the football stadiums where teams actually played 
the games.50  The Sixth Circuit found that the Title III claim failed for 
two reasons.51  First, the service was not discriminatory because the 
NFL blacked out the broadcasts to both hearing-impaired and 
hearing-able persons.52  Second, while viewers could watch the 
broadcasts on a television in a place of public accommodation and 
the broadcasts were “certainly offered through defendants, [they were] 
not offered as a service of [any] public accommodation”53The court 
clarified that Title III only covers the services “which the public 
accommodation offers, not [those] which the lessor of the public 
accommodation offers . . . .”54 
Stoutenborough provides a critical aspect of “integration,” which is 
the importance of establishing a connection between a challenged 
service’s functions and a particular place of public accommodation 
regardless of who is offering the service.55  The mere fact that a 
particular defendant leases a place of public accommodation and also 
happens to provide a specific service is insufficient to establish a 
“nexus”; rather, the service must somehow exemplify that physical 
place’s purpose.56  Therefore, a sufficient degree of “integration” 
requires something more than a televised broadcast, which viewers 
can watch in one place of public accommodation, of a game that a 
 
 49  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 953–54 (discussing previous 
decisions where courts considered the connection between challenged services and 
places of public accommodation). 
 50  Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, 59 F.3d 580, 581–82 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 51  Id. at 582–83. 
 52  Id. at 582. 
 53  Id. at 583 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 54  Id. (alteration in original). 
 55  Id. 
 56  Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583; Anderson, supra note 33, at 173 (“The court 
ruled that although the football game that the plaintiffs wanted to watch was held in 
a place of public accommodation, the television broadcast was not.”).  The Sixth 
Circuit seemed to contemplate coverage of only tangible barriers; however, this is not 
the state of the law today.  Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th 
Cir. 2002). 
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team plays in another place of public accommodation.57 
2.  The Inclusion of Intangible Barriers Under Rendon 
The Eleventh Circuit laid the groundwork for the Target court 
when it held that Title III’s coverage extended to intangible barriers 
that created discriminatory conditions.58  This decision became 
critical to the “nexus” approach’s future applicability to websites 
because it established that Title III’s statutory language plainly and 
unambiguously covered services that created discrimination from 
beyond the bricks and mortar of a place of public accommodation.59  
The challenged service in Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd. was a fast-
finger-question telephone-selection process for prospective 
contestants for the game show “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire.”60  
The plaintiffs—who were deaf and had upper-body mobility 
impairments—were unable to utilize this process to appear on the 
game show and brought claims alleging discrimination under Title 
III.61 
The Eleventh Circuit found that a substantial “nexus” existed 
between the telephone-selection process and the television studio 
that housed the game show because the process screened out 
disabled individuals who sought the privilege of participating in the 
game show.62  In arriving at its decision, the court emphasized that an 
intangible space, like a medium of communication, could create 
noncompliance with ADA standards when it impaired the right to full 
and equal enjoyment and participation under Title III.63  This 
decision moved courts away from the position that only physical or 
architectural barriers could create inaccessibility to the goods, 
privileges, and services of a place of public accommodation, and 
 
 57  Cf. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284 (distinguishing Stoutenborough and finding a 
sufficient “nexus” between a telephone-selection process and a television studio 
where a game show was conducted because the process was an intangible barrier to 
the privilege of competing on the show).  For more on assessing the possible degrees 
of “integration” that can exist, see discussion infra Parts II.D–F. 
 58  Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283–84.  Intangible barriers consist of eligibility 
requirements or screening criteria that hinder enjoyment and participation—or 
create a separate benefit—of the goods, services, privileges, etc. of public 
accommodations.  Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006). 
 59  Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284–86. 
 60  Id. at 1280.  The selection process required prospective contests to call a 
specified telephone number and enter responses to a series of pre-recorded 
questions using the telephone keypads.  Id. 
 61  Id. at 1281. 
 62  Id. at 1286. 
 63  Id. at 1283–84. 
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opened the door for the consideration of virtual barriers like the 
Internet.64 
3.  The Indirect Influence of Access Now 
While Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co. is in some ways the 
first decision to address Title III’s applicability to the Internet, this 
case is aimed more toward an argument that is not the focus of this 
Comment.65  The Southern District of Florida explicitly held that a 
website cannot itself be considered a place of public 
accommodation.66  But the court never considered the “nexus” 
argument for two reasons.67  First, it found that there was no physical 
place of public accommodation to connect to the southwest.com 
website in issue.68 Second and more importantly, the plaintiffs did not 
raise the “nexus” argument until the appeal, and the Eleventh Circuit 
was unable to consider a new legal theory due to its limited power of 
review.69 
Even though Access Now fell short of addressing the concept of 
“integration,” paired with Target, it creates a spectrum.70  This 
spectrum would include Target on one end as an example of a 
retailer-companion website that is fully integrated with a brick-and-
mortar store.71  The plaintiffs’ arguments in Access Now prevented a 
 
 64  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953–54 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
 65  227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).  The Access Now case is better classified 
as part of a group of Title III decisions that suggests a broader definition of the term 
“place of public accommodation.”  See, e.g., Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 
28 (2d Cir. 1999).  Pallozzi centered on the Second Circuit’s consideration as to 
whether Title III of the ADA regulates insurance underwriting practices.  Id. at 31.  
The significance of this decision directly tied into the conception that Title III was 
“meant to guarantee more than mere physical access.”  Id. at 32; see also Carparts 
Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 66  Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1317–19; see also DuPree, supra note 17, at 291 
(discussing how Target and Access Now are on opposite ends of a continuum with 
regard to the “nexus” approach). 
 67  The court’s only reference to the “nexus” approach was a simple 
acknowledgement of the need for a connection between the service and the place.  
Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1320 n.10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[S]ome connection between the good or service 
complained of and an actual physical place is required.”). 
 68  Id. at 1321. 
 69  Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
 70  DuPree, supra note 17, at 291.  This Comment does not view Access Now as a 
true “nexus” case to be on the spectrum of the degrees of “integration”; however, it 
views Access Now as a counterpoint to Target in terms of structure or presence of a 
business firm. 
 71  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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determination as to whether the website involved could be a 
companion website to any physical airline facility.72  Instead, Access 
Now represented an example of an entity that Title III could not 
reach—one that only appeared to function online—because the only 
identifiable space was a virtual one.73  Therefore, the opposite end of 
the spectrum would include completely virtual entities, like Amazon 
or Netflix, without any clear presence in an identifiable physical place 
of public accommodation.74 
B.  Extension of the “Nexus” Approach to Websites Under Target 
When the Northern District of California decided Target, it 
acknowledged the “nexus” approach for the first time as a judicially 
created mechanism to bring websites under the auspices of Title III.75  
Despite being only a district court decision, it was a catalyst for 
subsequent Title III suits and strongly influenced major companies to 
ensure accessibility to their websites.76  Target established that Title III 
covered a website when it acted as a virtual door to accessing the 
goods and services of a place of public accommodation.77  A website 
could act as a “gateway” when its inaccessibility created a separate 
benefit for those able to access it, or prevented full enjoyment or 
usage of the place’s goods or services to those would could not.78  The 
court premised its finding, that Title III covered intangible barriers 
like the Internet, on its interpretation of the statutory language of 
Title III, which explicitly specified coverage for the “services of” and 
not “services in,” a place of public accommodation.79 
 
 72  Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1329–30. 
 73  Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.  The plaintiffs did not identify any physical 
space, such as a Southwest airline facility, because they alleged that southwest.com 
denied access to “virtual ticket counters.”  Id.  Had the plaintiffs originally made the 
argument they later presented to the Eleventh Circuit, the Southern District of 
Florida could have made a determination as to whether southwest.com could be 
considered a companion website, like target.com, to the airline.  Access Now, 385 F.3d 
at 328. 
 74  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 75  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 955 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006) (extending the reasoning in Rendon to retailer website and finding a 
“nexus” to exist between the site and brick-and-mortar stores). 
 76  See supra note 21. 
 77  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954–55. 
 78  Id. at 954. 
 79  Id. at 953–54; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006) (emphasis added) (“No 
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”). 
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In Target, the court found that target.com’s inaccessibility to 
blind customers prevented full and equal enjoyment and usage of 
services that the retail stores offered because many benefits of the site 
were also services of the place of public accommodation.80  The court 
referred to the website as being “heavily integrated” with the brick-
and-mortar stores based on specific functions, such as the ability to 
access information on store locations and hours of operation, order 
photographs for pick-up, and print coupons to redeem in the store.81  
The court cautioned, however, that Title III only covered portions of 
a website that were directly related to the physical storefront, 
meaning that it did not cover “online only” products or deals.82 
C.  Ambiguities in the Aftermath of Target 
While Target provides a groundbreaking means for disabled 
litigants to seek relief under Title III for website inaccessibility, the 
court does not provide any concrete steps for implementing its 
reasoning.83  Despite a clear “judicial willingness to bring websites 
within the jurisdiction of Title III,” the Target court’s reasoning 
creates ambiguity with regard to how much “integration” is needed 
and how to apply the “nexus” approach to future situations—even 
those similar to the facts of Target.84  Even though a disabled 
individual can use the “nexus” test as a vehicle to combat the 
hardships of litigating Title III website claims,85 courts must further 
clarify Target’s operative language of “heavily integrated” and 
“gateway to the store.”86 
The “nexus” approach remains unclear at a time when Title III 
litigation is on the rise mainly because Target does not set forth the 
 
 80  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949, 956.  The blind customers were 
unable to access target.com because the website’s code could not be translated into 
vocalized text via usage of their screen-reader devices.  Id. at 949–50. 
 81  Id. at 949. 
 82  Id. at 956; see also discussion of Blockbuster infra Part IV.A.1. 
 83  DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91 (“While the Ninth Circuit found a nexus in 
Target because of integrated services of Target.com and Target stores, it did not state 
a rule regarding the degree of integration necessary to find a nexus.”). 
 84  Id. (alteration in original) (“[While the court displayed a] judicial willingness 
to bring websites within the jurisdiction of Title III . . . [it] did not state a rule 
regarding the degree of integration necessary to find a nexus.”). 
 85  Moberly, supra note 19, at 976 (alteration in original) (“[C]ourts have used 
the nexus approach to link the types of discrimination prohibited by the ADA with 
the places of public accommodation regulated by the statute.”). 
 86  DuPree, supra note 17, at 291 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) 
(“[T]arget provides an unformulated standard and will require other circuits to define 
points on the continuum between the endpoints as they address future Title III 
claims.”). 
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“minimum connection or integration required to find the necessary 
“nexus” between a website and public accommodation for Title III to 
apply.”87  Target does not consider the point at which “a website [can] 
become a ‘service’ of the place of public accommodation.”88  
Additionally, the extension of the Target court’s reasoning specifically 
“to retailers with website services less integrated to storefronts 
remains unclear.”89  While heavily integrated websites will clearly meet 
the “nexus” requirement under Target, the court’s reasoning could 
also suggest that “any connection between a store and website that 
affects the enjoyment of the goods and services of a store may be 
sufficient to find a nexus.”90  More importantly, with regard to the 
different types of business structures, Target does not even resolve the 
question of whether Title III can cover online-based companies like 
Redbox, which have a physical presence in a place of public 
accommodation.91  In addition, Target does not consider whether 
virtual companies Netflix or Amazon.com, “which [themselves have] 
 
 87  Id. at 301–02.  For more on why defining the degree of “integration” matters, 
see discussion infra Part II.F. 
 88  Bashaw, supra note 17, ¶ 13 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 89  DuPree, supra note 17, at 291.  Blockbuster, LLC is illustrative of a scenario 
where a retailer clearly owns and operates a website that bears less “integration” to its 
brick-and-mortar retail stores because consumers primarily utilize its website for a 
DVD-by-mail service.  See infra text accompanying notes 205–08.  This is especially so 
when compared to Apple, Inc., which offers the same deals and products on both its 
store site and brick-and-mortar stores.  See infra text accompanying notes 200–04. 
 90  DuPree, supra note 17, at 293 (emphasis added).  This interpretation could 
arguably extend coverage to separately owned websites with a presence in a public 
accommodation.  Key examples of this could be Redbox and perhaps Facebook 
because either websites’ inaccessibility could create a separate benefit, or prevent full 
and equal enjoyment of goods and services of a particular public accommodation.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006); discussion infra Parts IV.B–C.  The 
problem here again is the court’s failure to specify a minimum degree of 
“integration;” thus, it is a bit unclear whether other courts can even view analogous 
business set-ups to that in Target as having a heavily integrated website.  See discussion 
infra Parts III.B.1, IV.A.  Based on the Target court’s examples of acceptable 
integrated website functions, however, the “nexus” approach could cover a company 
that owns and operates brick-and-mortar stores and a website with “dual functions,” 
meaning it offers the same products, deals, store information, or online coupons to 
use in the store.  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 
949 (N.D. Cal. 2006).  Examples include Apple, Best Buy, Walmart, and perhaps 
Blockbuster because all own and operate websites and brick-and-mortar retail stores 
that make available the same products on both the site and the store, as well as have 
store locators, coupons, and information on the site.  See, e.g., In-Store Coupons, 
WALMART, http://coupons.walmart.com/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
 91  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 954–56 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006).  An entity like Redbox and perhaps Facebook would fall somewhere in 
between completely virtual and retailer-companion sites, but arguably closer to 
Target.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
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no physical presence but [do] link to and list products for sites that 
do have physical presences, such as Target, must be ADA 
compliant.”92  Such ambiguity is just one of the reasons that this 
Comment focuses on redefining the contours of the “nexus” 
approach and using a scenario where a website is separately owned, 
but appears to act as doorway to a separately owned retail store in a 
similar manner to the website in Target.93  Therefore, while Target is a 
critically important step in the process, it is clearly not the last step.94 
D.  2011: A Facebook Odyssey 
In 2011 courts addressed the “nexus” approach’s ambiguous 
state when multiple major corporations were sued under Title III for 
disability discrimination.95  Young v. Facebook, Inc. stood out amongst 
 
 92  Bashaw, supra note 17, ¶ 13 (alteration in original).  Interestingly, Netflix 
announced plans for a new way for its Canadian and Latin American customers to 
connect to their Facebook accounts via an integrated system, so that customers can 
share what they are watching on Netflix and see what their friends are watching all 
through Facebook.  Tom Willerer, Watch This Now: Netflix and Facebook, NETFLIX U.S. 
& CAN. BLOG (Sept. 22, 2011, 10:23AM), http://blog.netflix.com/2011/09/watch 
-this-now-netflix-facebook.html.  Netflix, like many other big companies, actually uses 
Amazon Web Services to power its website.  Michael Noer & Nicole Perloth, The 
World’s Most Powerful People, YAHOO! FIN. (Nov. 21, 2011, 1:35PM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-world-s-most-powerful-people.html?page=all.  
This Comment will not engage in this extra step consideration, meaning whether a 
completely removed website can be linked to another website that is sufficiently 
integrated to a regulated public accommodation; however, such considerations of an 
endless array of deeply complex relationships is just another reason why courts 
should establish a minimum degree of “integration” under the “nexus” approach. 
 93  The fact that Target does not consider at what point a website can become a 
service is one of the most troubling ambiguities for both companies with common 
ownership of a website and place of public accommodation and for a separately 
owned website that could be sufficiently integrated to a public accommodation.  
With regards to the latter, the critical inquiry is not only the minimum degree 
required but also whether a “nexus” is possible at all; it is clear that this scenario can 
exist given companies such as Redbox and Facebook. 
 94  See DuPree, supra note 17, at 291. 
 95  In addition to Karen Beth Young’s suit against Facebook, Sony Corporation 
was sued under Title III of the ADA pursuant to the “nexus” approach.  See Stern v. 
Sony Corp., No. CV 09-7710 PA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144042 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2010), aff’d  No. 10-55348, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23431 (9th Cir. Nov.17, 2011).  The 
plaintiff alleged that his visual-processing impairments prevented him from fully 
enjoying Sony’s video games, which are played over Internet connections, and thus 
also the conventions that Sony holds in connection with such games.  Id. at *1, *8–9.  
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that a “nexus” existed between the video games and 
the conventions because his inability to enjoy and acquire knowledge of the games 
had deterred him from attending such conventions.  Id. at *8–9.  The Stern court 
found the Title III claim to fail because the plaintiff did not allege that Sony was 
using its games to screen out the disabled from fully enjoying its conventions.  Id. at 
*9.  The court explicitly distinguished both the Rendon and Target cases, finding no 
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these suits for two primary reasons.96  First, the plaintiff advanced a 
“nexus” argument that reopened website “integration” questions due 
to its similarity to the argument accepted by the Target court.97  
Second, the case also generated a new interest in determining 
whether a web-based company could “operate” a separately owned 
place of public accommodation when its website appeared to meet 
 
allegations of a similar inaccessibility as seen in such cases.  Id. 
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient 
“integration” between Sony’s games and a facility owned, leased, or operated by the 
company.  Stern v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 10-55348, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23431, at 
*2 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2011).  Overall, the Ninth Circuit found that the connection 
between video games and marketing events associated with such games was “too 
tenuous” despite being hosted by the same company.  Id. at *3.  This decision 
appeared to reaffirm the theory that a challenged service must actually act as an 
intangible barrier to entry and not merely as a deterrent to entering a public 
accommodation. 
 The popular web-based rental-service-subscription company Netflix is currently 
also involved in a Title III suit as of 2011 for failure to implement closed captioning 
for the majority of its movies, which customers “stream instantly” over the Internet.  
Terry Baynes, Netflix, Time Warner Sued by U.S. Deaf Groups, REUTERS (June 17, 2011, 
6:48PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/netflix-lawsuit 
-idUSN1711044420110617.  Whether Netflix will be subject to liability under Title III 
is presently unclear given the ambiguity in the current law and the unique nature of 
the Internet-based company.  Netflix has further complicated matters by, as of 
September of 2011, separating its DVD-by-mail service from its instant streaming 
services.  At one point, Netflix made an announcement that it would also go as far as 
to rename its DVD-by-mail service—where the company began—”Qwikster,” appoint 
a new CEO to run Qwikster, create a separate domain name, and force customers to 
hold separate accounts regardless of whether they have both services or just one.  
Elizabeth A. Harris, Netflix To Break Business in Two, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Sept. 19, 2011, 
2:16 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/netflix-c-e-o 
-apologizes-for-handling-of-price-increase/?ref=elizabethaharris; Reed Hastings, An 
Explanation and Some Reflections, NETFLIX U.S. & CAN. BLOG (Sept. 18, 2011, 8:59 PM), 
http://blog.netflix.com/2011/09/explanation-and-some-reflections.html.  
Effectively, Qwikster would have become a wholly owned subsidiary of Netflix; 
however, the company has since scrapped such plans to re-name its DVD-rental 
service following extremely negative consumer and economic response.  Brian 
Stelter, Netflix, In Reversal, Will Keep Its Services Together, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Oct. 10, 
2011, 8:00 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/netflix 
-abandons-plan-to-rent-dvds-on-qwikster/. 
 96  790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  It should be noted that the challenged 
services in the Stern case were the video games, not the Internet connections such 
games operate on, and the “nexus” argument advanced did not allege inaccessibility 
per se; rather, it alleged a deterrence effect on the ability to fully and equally enjoy the 
services of a public accommodation.  Stern, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144042, at *8–9.  It 
is for the latter reason, the deterrence effect, that the court distinguished the Rendon 
and Target cases and found the claim to fail.  Id. at *9.  Additionally, the Netflix Title 
III suit is presently on-going and involves an entity that a court is likely to view as 
completely virtual, unlike a company like Redbox. 
 97  See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; discussion infra Part II.D.2. 
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Target’s “integration” concepts.98 
1.  Gift Card “Integration” 
In Young v. Facebook, Inc., Karen Beth Young alleged that 
Facebook deactivated her account because of her bipolar disorder, a 
Title III-covered disability,99 and deprived her of full and equal 
enjoyment and usage of the gift cards it provides through retail 
stores.100  The plaintiff appeared pro se and argued that a “nexus” 
existed under the Target framework because facebook.com was 
sufficiently integrated with various retail stores across the country.101  
The plaintiff premised her “integration” argument on the fact that 
 
 98  See discussion infra Parts III, IV.B–C.  Young serves as the basis for the question 
this Comment presents—establishing a “nexus” when a service and a public 
accommodation lack common ownership but appear to bear analogous “integration” 
to that in Target.  Young’s “nexus” argument seems to give rise to the idea of a web-
based company with some physical presence in a place of public accommodation.  See 
infra note 100. 
 99  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006). 
 100  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) 
(“[S]he contends that the alleged discrimination on Facebook’s website deprives her 
of full and equal access to the goods and services provided by Facebook through 
physical retail stores.”); Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 2 (alteration in 
original) (“Plaintiff has been denied full use and enjoyment of goods and services of 
consumer retail stores contracted with Facebook.com [and she] can not participate 
in or benefit from merchandise sales and public interactions.”); see also Amy E. 
Bivins, Facebook Defeats ADA Suit Involving Account Termination, Site Not “Public 
Accommodation, 16 ELEC. COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 887 (2011).  Young’s allegation of 
discriminatory conduct was grounded in Facebook’s management of her account, 
which prevented equal enjoyment of goods and services at brick-and-mortar stores 
that sells its gift cards.  Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5.  Her specific claim 
was that Facebook failed to provide “reasonable customer services to assist individuals 
with mental disabilities.”  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. 
 The plaintiff had sent friend requests to thousands of people she believed 
would be interested in her advocacy on cancer-related issues, as she had created 
several forums and pages on facebook.com.  Id. at 1113.  Facebook deactivated her 
account for the first time for “behavior identified as potentially harassing or 
threatening to other Facebook users, including sending ‘friend’ requests to people 
she did not know, regularly contacting strangers, and soliciting others for dating or 
business purposes.”  Id. at 1114.  Young made numerous inquiries to Facebook, citing 
her bipolar disorder and reasons for engaging in such behavior, but received no 
responses.  Id.  After making a trip from her home in Maryland to Facebook’s 
California headquarters, Facebook forced Young to leave a written request, which it 
responded to by reactivating her account with a warning.  Id.  Facebook permanently 
deactivated Young’s account for violating its Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities; however, Young was unsatisfied as this was allegedly in response to 
her mere request for further clarification and for a personal meeting.  Id.; see also 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/legal 
/terms (last updated April 26, 2011). 
 101  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.  As a side note, retail stores are places of 
public accommodation under Title III.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006). 
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Facebook used such stores for the benefit of selling its gift cards, 
which purchasers could only redeem for a virtual currency called 
Facebook Credits to use for online games and other applications.102  
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that her account deactivation meant 
that, while she could still buy Facebook gift cards from retail stores, 
she could no longer use the gift cards because the only way to redeem 
their value required access to facebook.com.103  The plaintiff 
referenced Facebook’s advertisement and promotion of its website at 
the brick-and-mortar stores to bolster the “integration” argument and 
the idea that the company had a presence in such stores.104  The 
plaintiff also listed the Best Buy rewards program as a specific 
“integration” example because purchasing a specific value of 
Facebook gift cards from Best Buy retail stores gave the member 
reward points that could then be used to purchase any store 
merchandise.105  Ultimately, the court was unable to assess the 
 
 102  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5.  
Facebook, Inc. first announced it would be “coming to a store near you” back in 
September 2010.  Jon Swartz, Target to Sell Facebook Credits Gift Cards, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 1, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-09-01-
target01_ST_N.htm.  Facebook, Inc. previously only had arrangements with online-
payment providers PayPal and MOL, so members could only purchase Facebook 
Credits directly from facebook.com.  Id.  Although Facebook gift cards are now 
available in a vast amount of retail stores, the fact that Swartz’s article singles out 
Target just makes it all the more bittersweet for the Young decision in the shadow of 
Target years earlier.  Facebook gift cards—which purchasers can redeem for 
“Facebook Credits” to be used in conjunction with member accounts— are not only 
available in all of Target’s retail stores but also on Target.com as well.  Id.; Facebook 
Credits Gift Cards-$25, TARGET, http://www.target.com/p/Facebook-Credits-Gift-Card-
25/-/A-12906868 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).  Facebook members purchase the gift 
cards to use them on facebook.com for “social games, applications and virtual 
goods.”  Swartz, supra.  Facebook defines such credits as “a virtual currency you can 
use to buy virtual goods in any games or apps of the Facebook platform that accept 
payment.”  Help CenterAbout Facebook Credits, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com 
/help/?page=132013533539778 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).  Facebook Credits can 
now also be used to rent various movies which can be watched on facebook.com.  
Facebook Credits Page, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/giftcards. 
 103  Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 7.  Cf. Stern v. Sony Corp., No. CV 09-
7710 PA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144042 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), aff’d  No. 10-55348, 
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23431 (9th Cir. Nov.17, 2011) (finding deterrence effect was 
not enough to constitute deprivation of full and equal enjoyment of usage of goods 
or services of places of public accommodation). 
 104  Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 6. 
 105  Id. at 5 (emphasis added) (“Facebook, Inc. Gift Card purchases directly 
translate to Rewards program points which in turn translate to physical merchandise of 
choice for consumers.”); see also Best Buy Reward Zone, BEST BUY, 
https://myrewardzone.bestbuy.com/rewarded/;cshid=0sBF0d6fFD9ZVJ3SxBji.5381 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2012).  This is a prime example of some level of “integration” 
between a separately owned websites and places of public accommodation, or even a 
commercial presence of the website in the public accommodation, because of the 
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“integration” argument because of the plaintiff’s failure to assert 
Facebook’s ownership, leasing, or operation of a place of public 
accommodation—a Title III statutory requirement.106 
Young was a missed opportunity to ensure consistent application 
of the “nexus” approach to websites because the court could have 
either bolstered or re-characterized the Target “integration” 
analysis.107  If the plaintiff had alleged that Facebook had a presence 
in the retail stores that sell its gift cards, and that this somehow 
translated into “operation” of such places, then the court may have 
been able to consider some of the ambiguity surrounding the 
necessary degree of “integration” under the “nexus” approach.108  
Instead, Young was just another example of the unsettling decisions 
that Title III litigations have produced, especially for pro se litigants.109 
 
separate benefit afforded to consumers that are able to redeem the value of store-
bought gift cards.  See DuPree, supra note 17, at 291. 
 106  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (emphasis added) (“While the retail stores that 
sell Facebook gift cards may be places of accommodation, Young does not allege that 
Facebook, Inc. ‘owns, leases (or leases to) or operates’ those stores.”); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006). 
 107  Compare Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (finding website’s inaccessibility to 
deny full and equal enjoyment of and participation in utilizing the value of gift cards 
sold by brick-and-mortar stores), with Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. 
Supp. 2d. 946, 954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding website’s inaccessibility to deny the 
ability to enjoy all of the services of the brick-and-mortar stores). 
 108  The plaintiff could have urged the court to interpret the language “affect 
commerce” under Title III in a manner to reflect the assertion that Facebook’s 
services are provided through retail stores.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006).  
Alternatively, she could have argued for a particular definition of “operates” by 
looking to other legal contexts.  See discussion infra Part III.A.2.  It is quite apparent, 
however, that Young would not have won on an ownership type of argument as 
Facebook does not own any physical retail stores.  See Facebook Info. Co. Overview, 
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited Jan. 27, 2012) 
(listing other ways to connect with Facebook, Inc.—none of which indicate any type 
of brick-and-mortar store). 
 109  Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (ruling in favor of attorneys for 
national advocacy organization for the blind pursuing Title III claim); see Eagan, 
supra note 30.  Young was unsettling because the court essentially dismissed the claim 
due to an inexperienced pro se litigant’s failure to assert a statutory element.  Young, 
790 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; Reed v. YMCA, No. 3:07-0765, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119311, 
at *1 (M.D. Tenn. 2008); see also Kashmir Hill, California Judge Scoffs at Karen Beth 
Young’s Facebook Banning Lawsuit, FORBES  (Sept. 8, 2010, 12:33 PM) (alteration in 
original), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/ 2010/09/08 
/california-judge-scoffs-at-karen-beth-youngs-facebook-banning-lawsuit/ (“[The 
judge] voiced extreme skepticism about Young’s complaint . . . explaining in the 
order that he has the right to [dismiss] ‘if it appears from the face of the proposed 
complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’”); Kashmir Hill, Maryland 
Woman Sues After Being Banned by Facebook, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2010, 1:33 PM), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/09/01/maryland-woman-sues-after-
being-banned-by-facebook/ (“Since it’s a pro se complaint—Young does not have a 
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2.  Young’s Analogy to and Potential Reinforcement of 
Target 
Karen Beth Young may have succeeded in her “nexus” argument 
given its analogy—in terms of “integration”—to the argument that 
the Target court accepted.110  In Target, the court found Title III to 
cover specific target.com benefits that included the ability to “access 
information on store locations and hours, refill a prescription or 
order photo prints for pick-up at a store, and print coupons to 
redeem at a store.”111  Similarly, in Young, the plaintiff had argued 
that facebook.com allowed its users “to peruse sale items, products, 
discounts and other consumer offers,” and that Facebook utilized 
promotions and coupons tied to its gift cards both online and in 
particular retail stores.112  More importantly, facebook.com had a 
store locator so that members could find a local gift card retailer,113 
which was a function similar to target.com’s information on store 
locations and hours.114  Therefore, Young was to some extent 
reconcilable with Target because the “integration” was similarly deep 
and complex.115 
While Young’s integration considerations were different in 
certain respects from those in Target, it is unlikely that these 
differences would have led to the dismissal of the “nexus”—putting 
aside the issues of ownership and operation with a web-based 
company.  Facebook deprived Young of access to its website’s “social 
networking” capability, a function that on the surface appeared 
distinct from the ability to redeem Facebook gift cards and the 
alleged discriminatory conduct.116  The discriminatory conduct, 
however, was indeed connected to the website’s overall functionality 
because Facebook intended for the usage of Facebook Credits to 
purchase and play games with other members on facebook.com to be 
a significant part of social networking.117  When Facebook deactivated 
 
lawyer—it’s a bit messy . . . .”).  But see Eric Goldman, Facebook User Loses Lawsuit Over 
Account Termination—Young v. Facebook, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 19, 2011, 
1:29PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/05/ (noting that the Young 
court expressed sympathy for the pro se plaintiff’s circumstances despite its ultimate 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims). 
 110  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949, 956. 
 111  Id. at 950. 
 112  Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 7. 
 113  See Facebook Credits Page, supra note 102. 
 114  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 950.  This was one of the functions 
the Target court found Title III to cover.  Id. 
 115  See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 116  Id. 
 117  See Doug Gross, The Facebook Games That Millions Love (and Hate), CNN TECH 
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Karen Beth Young’s account it not only took away her ability to write 
a wall post,118 poke,119 or make a status update,120 but also took away 
her ability to purchase Facebook Credits online, use them for games, 
and find or redeem the value of gift cards.121  While Young then had 
no reason to purchase gift cards from stores, the remaining one 
billion plus members purchased and utilized the value of the cards 
without issue.122  Even though Facebook offered different methods for 
the purchase of Facebook Credits—store gift cards versus 
facebook.com—users ultimately sought the same item.123  Therefore, 
the account deactivation created an intangible barrier to the 
enjoyment of a good because, while Young could purchase Facebook 
Credits in stores, she could not use them at all.124  This is exactly the 
type of discrimination that Title III’s drafters aimed to prevent.125 
E.  Redbox as a Potential Bridge from Target to Young 
Courts may have a new opportunity to clarify both “integration” 
and “operation” under the “nexus” approach because a blind 
advocacy group filed a Title III suit in 2012 against Redbox, a 
 
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-23/tech/facebook.games_1_mark-
pincus-video-games-facebook?_s=PM:TECH (discussing overwhelming popularity of 
social-gaming).  But see Tricia Duryee, Not that Many People Play Facebook Games After 
All, ALL THINGS DIGITAL (Oct. 18, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20111018 
/not-that-many-people-play-facebook-games-after-all/ (discussing how Facebook’s 
shift from counting visitors to only counting actual authorized users when assessing 
data on how many members play its games shows much less active users). 
 118  Kevin Der, Facebook Is Off-The-Wall, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (July 27, 2007, 
10:05PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=3532972130. 
 119  Michael Arrington, 85% of College Students Use Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 7, 
2005), http://techcrunch.com/2005/09/07/85-of-college-students-use-facebook/. 
 120  Claire Suddath, Facebook Wants to Read Your Mind, TIME (Mar. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1885010,00.html. 
 121  Help Center Purchasing Facebook Credits, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com 
/help/147215735350834/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (alteration in original) (“You 
can purchase Facebook Credits directly from within an app . . . [or] go to the 
Payments tab in your Account Settings.”). 
 122  See Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 7 (“Facebook, Inc. denies Plaintiff 
access to goods, services and information made available by retail stores by 
preventing Plaintiff from being a registered member of Facebook.”); see also Guynn, 
supra note 29. 
 123  See Amended Complaint, supra note 31 at 7; Swartz, supra note 102. 
 124  See discussion of Facebook “integration” under the “Backdoor Nexus” 
approach infra Part IV.C. 
 125  See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)–(b) (2006); Mook, supra note 7, at 6 (alteration in 
original) (citing Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 955 
(N.D. Cal. 2006)) (“Title III of the ADA [does] not create a dichotomy between 
‘those services which impede physical access to a public accommodation and those 
merely offered by a facility.’”). 
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company that operates through both a website and interactive kiosks 
residing in retail stores.126  While Redbox’s interactive kiosks are the 
challenged service in this case, as opposed to redbox.com, the court’s 
ultimate decision may provide an answer to the minimum 
“integration” that the “nexus” approach requires, as well as whether a 
web-based company with a physical presence can “operate” a place of 
public accommodation.127  The court can address the required degree 
of “integration,” and then apply that determination to future 
litigation involving redbox.com, because the plaintiffs allege that the 
kiosks are “services of” the retail store spaces that Redbox controls.128  
Even though Redbox does not own a physical space, the court can 
also address “operation” because the company’s kiosks give it a clear 
presence in a portion of a physical space that it controls.129  Redbox 
therefore may act as a bridge between Target and Young because it is 
one step above a “companion website” like Target, but one step below 
a completely virtual space like Amazon or perhaps Facebook.130 
F.  Why the Degree of “Integration” Matters 
Since the Target court, like Title III’s drafters, does not specify 
the required degree of “integration,” current application of its 
reasoning remains challenging even to analogous scenarios like 
Young or Redbox.131It is critical to resolve the uncertainties 
 
 126  Compl. for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101, et. seq., the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et. seq., and the 
California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54–54.3, Lighthouse for the Blind 
and Visually Impaired v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, No. C12-00195 LB (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 12, 2012), available at www.dralegal.org/downloads/cases/Redbox 
/Complaint.doc [hereinafter Redbox Complaint]; see discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 127  Redbox Complaint, supra note 126. 
 128  Id. at 10.  The critical inquiry is not whether any relationship exists between 
Redbox and the retail stores or supermarkets where its kiosks happen to reside; 
rather, it is the existence of a portion of a Redbox-controlled physical space that is 
vital to both the “integration” and “operation” inquiries.  See discussion infra Part 
III.A.2.ii. 
 129  See Redbox Complaint, supra note 126, at 10.  Note, however, the plaintiffs in 
the Redbox 2012 litigation also allege the kiosks themselves are places of public 
accommodation.  Id.  In conjunction with its filing of a motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ claim, co-defendant Save Mart Supermarket actually argues that it does not 
control the particular spaces that it provides to Redbox for the rental kiosks, thus 
supporting the notion that Redbox “operates” a portion of a place of public 
accommodation.  Lighthouse for the Blind and Visually Impaired v. Redbox 
Automated Retail, LLC, No. C12-0195, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70007, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
May 18, 2012).  The Northern District of California has since denied Save Mart’s 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Id. at *12–13. 
 130  See discussion infra Part IV; infra Figure 1. 
 131  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 
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surrounding the necessary degree of “integration” because 
computers today can provide a virtual door to both business 
structures like that of Target, and also to web-based companies with 
some kind of presence in a place of public 
accommodations.132Refinement of the “nexus” approach with greater 
attention paid to defining the required degree of “integration” is 
especially necessary when it is unclear whether a particular website 
can be classified as a service of a public accommodation, as a result of 
either questions of ownership and control or the business 
enterprise’s structure.133 
If courts do not modify the “nexus” approach, then Title III’s 
application to inaccessible business websites will often depend on 
“judicial interpretation[s] of Target.”134  Such interpretations would 
focus on defining the degree of “integration” in a specific case, but 
without any type of specific factors to consider.135  The danger in 
relying upon judicial interpretation of Target without a specific set of 
criteria is the possibility of inconsistent results for virtually identical 
business/website set-ups and the potential finding that Title III does 
not cover websites with a physical presence in a public 
accommodation.136  If, however, courts use Target’s Title III-covered 
 
1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011); DuPree, supra note 17, at 291. 
 132  Application of the Target court’s reasoning to virtually identical scenarios, as 
well as the extension to web-based companies that nonetheless have a physical 
presence in a public accommodation, is unclear and troublesome.  For example, 
Apple and Blockbuster have set-ups akin to that of Target, in that the former 
companies both own and operate brick-and-mortar stores across the country and a 
companion website.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.  Utilizing the Target court’s 
example of Title III-covered website functions alone, it appears that a plaintiff could 
establish a “nexus” for such set-ups if these websites ever became inaccessible to the 
disabled.  But whether the Target court’s examples alone will constitute sufficient 
“integration” is an inference at best because the court did not specify a minimum 
degree of information.  DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91.Blockbuster is perhaps a 
weaker example than Apple because even though Blockbuster operates a DVD-by-
mail service analogous to Netflix that customers can manage online, it is stronger 
than Netflix because of the unitarily owned brick-and-mortar Blockbuster stores.  See 
supra note 89.  Whether or not Target would fit a scenario where blockbuster.com is 
less integrated to its brick-and-mortar counterparts is unclear without elaboration of 
the language in Target.  But see discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 133  See Bashaw, supra note 17, ¶ 13.  “Business enterprise’s structure” refers either 
to retailers with both brick-and-mortar stores and a companion website or to web-
based businesses with some physical presence in a public accommodation. 
 134  DuPree, supra note 17, at 293 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 135  See id. 
 136  See id. at 293–94.  Even moving beyond the ownership issues in Young, it is 
difficult to tell if, despite its similarities to Target, the Young court would have 
correctly applied Target for the “integration” element to reflect such similarities when 
the defendant is a web-based company with a physical presence—as opposed to a 
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website functions and other similar types of functions, then a 
spectrum of the possible degrees of “integration” will account for 
these entities.137 
Defining the “nexus” approach with greater specificity will avoid 
a misinterpretation that leads to a web-based company with a physical 
presence like Redbox being grouped with completely virtual entities 
such as Amazon or Netflix that already fall outside of Title III.138  
Doing so will also help clarify Title III’s applicability to a company 
like Facebook because courts could view such an entity as either 
completely virtual or just another example of a website with less 
“integration” to a physical space.139  Therefore, courts should carefully 
refine the “nexus” approach and make “integration” a top priority 
when assessing whether a “nexus” exists because the approach’s 
purpose is to link the website to a place of public accommodation 
when inaccessibility to the former can impede enjoyment of or 
participation in the latter.140 
While defining the degree of “integration” is critical, defining it 
does not complete the “nexus” inquiry because Target does not 
account for another Title III problem that the Young court faced: 
ownership/operation/leasing.141  Courts must consider this other 
 
brick-and-mortar company with a secondary website. 
 137  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D. Cal. 
2006); see infra Part IV.A.  This point ties in directly to the aforementioned concerns 
regarding application of Target not only to web-based companies, or websites one 
step removed from their brick-and-mortar companions, but to businesses with 
virtually identical set-ups in the absence of a specified degree of “integration” 
needed.  See DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91. 
 138  See DuPree, supra note 17, at 301–02. 
 139  See id. at 291; see also discussion infra Part IV.C.  The suggestion that 
facebook.com cannot even have some type of a physical presence in a public 
accommodation is a bit draconian given its pervasiveness all over the world.  
Facebook has even been called an addiction or compulsion due to its overwhelming 
influence on everyday life.  See Elizabeth Cohen, Five Clues That You are Addicted to 
Facebook, CNN HEALTH (Apr. 23, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-04-23/health 
/ep.facebook.addict_1_facebook-page-facebook-world-social-networking?_s=PM 
:HEALTH (alteration in original) (“[T]herapists say they’re seeing more and more 
people . . . who’ve crossed the line from social networking to social dysfunction.”). 
 140  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954–55. 
 141  See id. at 949 (noting how Target owns and operates both the brick-and-mortar 
store locations and target.com, and therefore not addressing the Title III 
requirement of ownership, operation, or leasing).  Young is valuable not only due to 
its intriguing “integration” argument but also because it presents both an argument 
for “integration” and questions surrounding the element of common ownership and 
operation.  Young demonstrates the need to define and assess the level of emphasis 
for the requirement of “operation” under Title III—specifically when the unique 
nature of the Internet is implicated— as this was arguably the “straw that  broke the 
camel’s back” in said case.  Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 
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element because, in addition to its presence in Title III’s statutory 
language and its potential to bolster the “nexus” test, the failure to 
agree on a consistent interpretation of “operation” can still hinder a 
“nexus” claim, even with a clear depiction of “integration.”142  The way 
in which courts define this requirement when a web-based entity’s 
site creates a virtual door to a store—a door that the retailer does not 
own—will determine the entity’s Title III status.143 
III.  “OPERATION” AND THE “BACKDOOR NEXUS” APPROACH 
Since there is presently no case law specifying factors to consider 
when a noncompliant virtual space creates a doorway to a separately 
owned physical space that is compliant, this section will first address 
the different ways that courts have defined “operation” through 
generalized approaches and analogous contexts.144  This initial 
discussion will introduce concepts that this Comment’s proposed 
standard ultimately incorporates.145  This section will then set forth 
the “Backdoor Nexus” approach’s two-prong framework, beginning 
with “integration” and then “operation.” 
A.  Defining “Operation” 
1.  General Approaches 
Generalized approaches to defining “operation” will not, by 
themselves, account for web-based entities because the Internet is a 
dynamic and complex medium of communication.146  Courts often 
 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 142  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006); discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 143  See discussion infra Parts III.B, IV. 
 144  See supra note 26; see also infra Figure 1.  This Comment will give primary 
attention to Title III’s “operation” requirement in order to maintain focus on the 
disparate-ownership scenario—as seen in Young.  This is not meant to suggest that 
ownership or leasing is any less important but rather that courts will be more likely to 
scrutinize “operation,” and “operation” is a better fit for this scenario.  Moreover, as a 
general matter Title III does not accord any type of elevated status for ownership.  
Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 872–73 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (“[L]imiting the reach of the 
statute to owners . . . would conflict with § 42 U.S.C. 12182(b) . . . .”); Leonard v. 
Israel Discount Bank, 967 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis added) (“The 
legislative history of the ADA confirms that Title III, as its plain meaning tells us, was 
intended to regulate owners and lessees of places of public accommodation.”). 
 145  See discussion infra Parts III.A.2–B. 
 146  See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: 
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006) (discussing the never-
ending clashes between the Internet as a communication medium and the 
governmental attempts to regulate it).  In these circumstances, the absence of a 
definition of an explicit statutory term—”operates”— is just as troublesome as an 
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utilize dictionary definitions as a default measure for defining legal 
terms; however, such definitions are insufficient because they often 
generate more questions.147  The term “operate” is no exception 
because its plain meaning is “to control or direct the functioning of,” 
but there is no indication as to what constitutes “control” or 
“direction” nor how much control or direction is sufficient to 
constitute “operation.”148  To deal with the problems inherent in 
dictionary definitions, courts often attempt to supplement dictionary 
definitions by utilizing broad agency principles.149  They generally 
focus on authoritative and discretionary factors, as well as the right to 
control and the appearance of control.150  But the specific context 
 
ambiguous judicial term already mentioned—”integration.”  This Comment will not 
only assess the sufficiency of the degree of “integration” through comparisons to 
analogous and dissimilar business set-ups along a spectrum, but will also evaluate the 
possible definitions of “operates” through comparisons to other scenarios. 
 147  Courts that take the dictionary approach construe a term “in accord with its 
ordinary and natural meaning.”  E.g., Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 
1066 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 931 (Rev. ed. 
1980)) (“To ‘operate’, in the context of a business operation, means ‘to put or keep 
in operation.’”).  The exact issue in Neff was whether American Dairy Queen’s 
“contractual rights under the . . . franchise agreement demonstrate that ADQ 
‘operates’ the San Antonio Stores.”  Id. at 1065.  The court was hesitant to “bend 
‘operates’ too far beyond its natural meaning . . . .”  Id. at 1069. 
 148  Id. at 1066 (alteration in original) (citing WEBSTER’S II: NEW RIVERSIDE 
UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 823 (1988)); Dahlberg v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 1091, 1102 (D. Colo. 2000). 
 149  See, e.g., Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 
874–78 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the term “operates” to be very expansive, 
considering the distinction between public and private ownership, examining the 
level of control exercised, and discussing the effect of a short-term operation of a 
public accommodation). 
 150  See, e.g., Dahlberg, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (finding control over “day-to-day 
operations” to be a factor for Title III “operation” ); Coddington v. Adelphi Univ., 45 
F. Supp. 2d 211, 215 (E.D. NY 1999) (“The term ‘operate’ has been interpreted as 
being in a position of authority and having the power and discretion to perform 
potentially discriminatory acts.”); see also Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 77 (N.D. 
Ohio 1994); Reed v. YMCA, No. 3:07-0765, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119311, at *4 (M.D. 
Tenn. July 22, 2008) (considering factors of “operation” such as organization 
documents, direction of operations, or direct involvement in the wrongful conduct).  
Courts typically focus on such factors in the franchisor liability context.  See Kathleen 
Pearson, Let’s All Go to the Dairy Queen Without Margo!: The Liability of Franchisors Under 
Title III of the Americans with Disability Act After Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 
101 DICK. L. REV. 137, 145–47 (1996) (discussing how the right to control the work of 
an agent is critical, that establishment of such relationship is a matter of fact, and 
that apparent agency is another consideration courts could use to impose liability if 
the customer reasonably relied on the franchisee’s apparent authority); see also 
discussion infra Part III.A.2.  For a more in-depth overview of agency conceptions in 
the franchisor context, including the typical control factors that courts consider, see 
Randall K. Hanson, The Franchising Dilemma Continues: Update on Franchisor Liability for 
Wrongful Acts by Local Franchisees, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 91, 93–98 (1997).  While 
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often dictates the determination and application of such factors.151  
Therefore, in order to fill the gaps left open by these general 
approaches, courts should use concepts derived from analogous 
contexts to define “operation” in the Internet context.152 
2.  Concepts Derived from Analogous Contexts 
With the increasing complexity of a web-based company’s 
structure, it is important to consider concepts from scenarios that 
involve two separately owned entities whose businesses nonetheless 
become intertwined.153 
i.  Specific Control Over the Demanded Modification 
A plaintiff can establish “operation” of a noncompliant place of 
public accommodation under Title III upon a showing of specific 
control over the inaccessible service or the demanded modification.154  
This type of “operation” primarily exists in the franchising context 
which, despite invoking the same statutory authority, has yet to 
 
customers are aware that, for example, Redbox is a separate company from Shop 
Rite, customers are likely to at least assume that the companies have some type of 
business relationship that allows Redbox kiosks to occupy a particular portion of 
supermarket, and that Redbox is responsible for that particular area.  See discussion 
infra Parts III.B.2.ii, IV.B. 
 151  See Pearson, supra note 150, at 143 (discussing how the Department of Justice 
has supported the theory of extending liability to the franchisor by arguing that ADA 
operator status is a question of fact). 
 152  Unique mediums create unique forms of discrimination—closing a virtual 
door to a store or creating a separate benefit—that warrant different theories.  See 
GLYNN, ANROW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 39, at 509. 
 153  See Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 793 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the “degree of interrelation 
between the operations” of two entities is a critical factor for determining whether 
they are actually operating as one entity); Richards, supra note 11, at 521 (“Some 
commentators have predicted the Internet becoming the absolute standard for 
businesses . . . .”).  The “nexus” argument in Young implicated a connection between 
two distinct entities—Facebook and a separately owned commercial retail store.  
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  The 
aforementioned Netflix 2011 announcement regarding the formation of Qwikster is 
a prime example of the overlap between role of the corporate form and the unique 
nature of the Internet.  See supra note 95. 
 154  Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066–67 (5th Cir. 1995); Nat’l 
Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-CV-30168, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84518, at 
*11 (D. Mass. June 19, 2012) (citations omitted).  Neff employs a “prevalent theor[y 
for determining] who is an operator under the ADA.”  United States v. Days Inn, 22 
F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (E.D. KY 1998) (alteration in original); see also Pearson, supra 
note 150, at 138 (Neff is a “test case on the liability of franchisors under Title III.”).  
For further background of Neff and the liability of franchisors under Title III of the 
ADA, see generally Pearson, supra note 150. 
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overlap with Title III website litigation.155  Courts have not considered 
this type of “operation” in the Internet context because franchising 
cases generally involve a physical barrier to only one space—a 
noncompliant physical place of public accommodation.156  Title III 
Internet cases involve two spaces, one physical and one virtual, but 
the demanded modification in these cases is located in the virtual 
space—as opposed to in the place of public accommodation.157  
Adapting this aspect of “operation” into the “Backdoor Nexus” 
approach, however, will ensure that the nature of the barrier and the 
number of spaces involved do not circumvent liability in 
contravention of Title III’s statutory language.158  Thus, if a plaintiff 
 
 155  Unlike Title III franchising litigation, Title III website litigation has had a clear 
disparity in results.  Compare Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 
946 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding Title III to cover inaccessible website), with Young, 790 
F. Supp. 2d 1110 (dismissing Title III claim involving inaccessible website without 
considering the merits of the “nexus” argument), and Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest 
Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding Title III to be 
inapplicable to inaccessible website). 
 156  There does not appear to be any Title III case that implicates franchising 
relationships and intangible discriminatory barriers; the majority of such cases 
implicate only physical or architectural barriers.  E.g., Neff, 58 F.3d 1063; Lieber v. 
Macy’s West, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1999).  This is surprising 
considering that the Internet has a commanding presence, as it now provides society 
with virtual goods, services, currencies, and even doors.  For example, Facebook 
Credits are “a virtual currency you can use to buy virtual goods in any games or apps of 
the Facebook platform . . . .”  Help Center About Facebook Credits, FACEBOOK, supra note 
102 (emphasis added).  Also, target.com acts as a door to the brick-and-mortar 
Target retail stores.  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955 (“The challenged 
service here is heavily integrated with the brick-and-mortar stores and operates in 
many ways as a gateway to the stores.”).  Moreover, another reason courts may not 
have extended this definition of “operation” is the fact that there is currently no 
scenario where a web-based company has entered into some type of franchising 
arrangement.  But this scenario is possible down the line because web-based 
companies like Amazon have been branching out in recent years, beyond the 
traditional online order/warehouse system.  See, e.g., Michael Noer & Nicole Perloth, 
supra note 92 (noting how Amazon is “exerting increasing power over the publishing 
business through the Kindle,” which several major retail stores like Target sell).  
Further, there already exists a chain of brick-and-mortar stores called “iSold It” that 
sell merchandise on the web-based company eBay through the stores. 
 157  E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946. 
 158  See Kenneth Kronstadt, Looking Behind the Curtain: Applying Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act to the Businesses Behind Commercial Websites, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 111, 131 (2007) (“Title III does not require that the public must physically enter 
any such ‘place’ to be protected against discrimination.”).  Rendon and Target both 
explicitly state that Title III covers intangible barriers to a place of public 
accommodation, and, therefore, the discrimination’s nature and location cannot 
defeat a claim that demonstrates sufficient “integration.”  See supra Parts II.A.2, B.  
Further, the Neff court held that, although outside the scope of a Title III franchising 
case, control of “non-structural” aspects—e.g. accounting, trademarks, etc.—”may be 
relevant in other contexts . . . [if it relates] to the allegedly discriminatory 
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can demonstrate a defendant’s ownership or control of the 
noncompliant virtual space that is now a “service of” the physical 
space, then the control that is exercised over that space may carry 
over to the physical space—so long as a plaintiff can first satisfy 
“integration.”159 
ii.  Limited Occupation 
Commercial landlord-tenancy contributes an important step to 
defining “operation” because the nature of an occupant’s association 
with the discriminatory conditions is more important than the 
duration of the occupation and the size of the space.160  Under Title 
III, either a landlord, its temporary tenant, or both can be 
responsible for ADA compliance of a place of public accommodation, 
 
conditions . . . .”  Neff, 58 F.3d at 1067 (alteration in original); see also Pearson, supra 
note 150, at 144.  This Comment will adapt the specific-control concept to fit the 
disparate-ownership scenario because courts in Title III franchising cases typically 
consider whether a non-owning entity has “in some way actually cause[d] the [owner] 
to comply or not to comply with the ADA.”  Days Inn, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 616 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
  While some commentators take the view that holding franchisors liable would 
provide a possible disincentive for the franchisee to comply with the ADA, this point 
only has muster when it is the franchisee who has failed to comply with the ADA.  See 
Pearson, supra note 150, at 143.  When the entity that a plaintiff is attempting to hold 
liable under Title III is the one who has failed to comply with the mandates of the 
ADA, then this point is clearly inapplicable; in Young, it was Facebook itself, while not 
a “franchisor,” which created the alleged discriminatory condition.  Young, 790 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1114.  As a side note, if a case implicates a parent-subsidiary relationship, 
courts are similarly loath to extend liability to the parent company; however, if the 
parent is “linked to the alleged discriminatory action,” then it can be held liable. 
Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 795 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 159  See discussion infra Part III.B.  The Neff court considered whether limited 
control over a franchisee store could translate into “operation” under Title III.  Neff, 
58 F.3d at 1066.  Traditionally, the entity controlling a service of a place of public 
accommodation also controls the place itself.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. 
Supp. 2d 946.  It is unclear, relying upon Neff alone, what will happen when the 
demanded modification is not actually part of the place of public accommodation.  
For example, in Young, the demanded modification was access to the website 
facebook.com.  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.  Even though Facebook owned the 
service, the plaintiff alleged that the inaccessibility affected a good sold in a 
separately owned retail store.  Id.  It may be the case that “integration” and 
“operation” are intertwined under this standard from Neff, such that if the demanded 
modification is actually off-site, but nonetheless connected to the public 
accommodation, then the claim is successful.  See discussion infra Parts IV.B–C.  In 
other words, if a separately owned service bears a “nexus” to a place of public 
accommodation, then the idea is that the entity controlling the service, which is 
creating the discriminatory conditions, can “operate” the place if other criteria are 
met. 
 160  See supra note 36.  Normally the landlord-tenant context is more suitable for 
the lease requirement of Title III.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006). 
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depending on who creates the discriminatory condition and whether 
they are using the occupied or controlled space to engage in 
commerce.161  Likewise, the Supreme Court supports the proposition 
that “under [Title III], a place of public accommodation may be 
‘operated’ by entities who do not own the facility and use it for a 
limited time period only.”162  Courts can hold a non-owning entity 
liable as an operator so long as the entity uses a place of public 
accommodation during the same time period in which the 
discriminatory conditions occur.163   
The conception that an entity can operate a place for a limited 
time begets the important consideration as to whether, like a leasing 
tenant, a web-based company can engage in commerce through a 
limited space of a place of public accommodation under Title III.164  
 
 161  See Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053–54 (S.D. Cal. 1998) 
(“Under the ADA, liability attaches to landlords and tenants alike.”); 28 C.F.R. § 
36.201(b) (2011) (alteration in original) (“[The ADA covers] both the landlord who 
owns the building that houses a place of public accommodation and the tenant who 
owns or operates the place of public accommodation . . . .”); AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL COVERING PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES, III-1.2000.B (1994 Supp.), 
[hereinafter “TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL”], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3up.html (“The fact that a landlord in a 
particular case is not covered by the ADA does not necessarily negate Title III’s 
coverage of private entities that lease or operate places of public accommodation 
within the facility.”); Paul V. Sullivan, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An 
Analysis of Title III and Applicable Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1117, 1127 (1995) 
(“Both parties remain subject to liability.”). 
 162  Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 874 
(9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (discussing PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 
661 (2001)).  Under the ADA, “operation” is an extensive term that includes 
“‘sublesses, management companies, and any other entity that . . . operates a place of 
public accommodation, even if the operation is for a short time.’”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added) (citing 28 C.F.R., ch 1, pt. 35, app. B, at 628 (1999)). 
 163  Dahlberg v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1105 (D. Colo. 
2000).  With a workable definition of “operates,” the Young court could have held 
Facebook liable if it had a presence in retail stores during the time of the alleged 
discriminatory conduct.  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 164  See, e.g., Disabled Rights Action Comm., 375 F.3d at 878.  In this case, the Ninth 
Circuit considered whether the Las Vegas Events group “operated” the public-
accommodation center when it sponsored rodeos; effectively, the group was 
operating a whole space but during a limited time.  Id.  Courts would have to 
recognize that the size of such space is not dispositive when considering whether an 
entity’s operations affect commerce in a place of public accommodation.  The ADA’s 
public-accommodation provision explicitly requires the engaging of commerce 
through the particular space irrespective of the size of such space.  42 U.S.C. § 
12181(7) (2006). 
  As a business entity’s structure has evolved, so has its ability to affect 
commerce.  See supra note 6.  With the nature of web-based companies and the 
current ambiguities surrounding “integration,” the “nexus” approach will become a 
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For example, many web-based companies have a “presence” in places 
of public accommodation, but such presence is more apparent in 
companies like Redbox that use a physical mechanism to provide 
services, as opposed to more virtual companies that do not.165  These 
companies create discriminatory conditions that may impact a limited 
space that they occupy or control, but that another company owns; 
this is in some ways likened to the landlord and tenant scenario.166 
There is no current authority that directly addresses the 
“operation” of a limited space, like part of a retail store; however, 
pertinent Title III sources may support the theory.167  A place of 
 
mere illusion if it is not refined.  On the other end, there is a concern for placing less 
emphasis on “operation” based on a plain reading of Title III.  Pickern v. Pier 1 
Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (“The 
statute says nothing about liability by persons who could operate a place of public 
accommodation.”); see also Pearson, supra note 150, at 148 (distinguishing franchisor 
liability under Title VII from liability under the ADA because the ADA “bases liability 
on status as an operator”).  Greater emphasis on the requirement of “operation” may 
be better left for those arguments where a plaintiff asserts that a website is a place of 
public accommodation itself.  E.g., Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. 
Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 165  Redbox is one such example of operating a limited space because its business 
structure is built around rental kiosks that Redbox owns and operates but that are 
located within a particular part of a retail store—a regulated public accommodation.  
Media Center Facts About Redbox, supra note 40.  Additionally, courts can apply the 
“nexus” approach to concrete spaces like airline ticket counters; however, there is no 
disparate-ownership scenario regarding a ticket counter and surrounding airline 
facility.  See Khouri, supra note 2, at 338 (discussing the Access Now case).  It is more 
difficult to establish a physical presence for companies like Facebook and Amazon 
because they provide trademarked goods in retail stores as opposed to setting up a 
physical mechanism to retrieve such goods or services. 
 166  E.g., Lighthouse for the Blind and Visually Impaired v. Redbox Automated 
Retail, LLC, No. C12-0195, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70007, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 
2012) (“Save Mart does not control the design or operation of the kiosks, and has no 
power to change them.”); see supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text; see also 
discussion infra Part IV. 
 167  See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011).  Regardless of the presence of sources, it is 
nearly impossible to imagine a world where “temporary” does not include limited 
spaces that could subject such entities to Title III liability.  If the overarching space of 
the place of public accommodation is the only area subject to Title III regulation, 
this may create a complete risk allocation to the public accommodation’s owner for 
all discriminatory conduct occurring within any sub-divisions.  “Operation” of a 
limited space may be akin to leasing an office space in a building or corporate park.  
See TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 161 (setting forth an example 
where Title III covers private entities that rent and operate spaces as retail stores in a 
building owned by an executive agency).  Operators of a small space such as an office 
within a corporate park could escape liability through such sub-division, and the risk 
would be shifted completely to the building owner.  Such shifting would contravene 
the landlord-tenant regime under Title III wherein both a landlord and tenant can 
be subject to Title III liability.  See Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053–54 
(S.D. Cal. 1998); 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(b) (2011). 
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public accommodation is a “facility, operated by a private entity, 
whose operations affect commerce,”168 and the Code of Federal 
Regulations defines a “facility” to include “all or any portion of 
buildings [or] structures . . . .”169  Moreover, the ADA can classify 
specific portions of a business as a place of public accommodation.170  
Incorporating this concept into the proposed framework will allow 
for an entity like Redbox, which links its website to the kiosks that 
provide its rental services, to “operate” a limited space of a public 
accommodation because its kiosks physically occupy part of that 
place.171  Redbox can essentially serve as a “bridge” to unite Title III 



















 168  § 12181(7). 
 169  § 36.104 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 170  GOREN, supra note 6, at 68, 146.  Furthermore, when a “portion of a facility 
containing a primary function is altered, the path of travel to that portion . . . must 
also be made readily accessible . . . .”  Id. at 72.  The term “primary function” is 
defined as a “major activity for which the facility is intended . . . .”  Id. (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The concept of separating limited 
spaces within one encompassing space has also been suggested in the private 
residency context.  See 28 C.F.R. § 36.207(a) (2011) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (“[T]he portion of the residence used exclusively as a residence is 
not covered . . . but that portion used exclusively in the operation of the place of public 
accommodation or that portion used both for the place of public accommodation 
and for residential purposes is covered . . . .”). 
 171  See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
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Figure 1: The Four Quadrants of Title III Liability172 
                                                             Redbox175 
B.  “Backdoor Nexus” Framework for Establishing “Integration” and 
“Operation” 
This section sets forth the proposed two-prong analysis for the 
“Backdoor Nexus” approach.  The first prong—”integration”—urges 
courts to re-characterize Target by adopting a totality of the 
circumstances approach because they have been unable to 
consistently apply the ambiguous concept of “integration” to similar 
factual scenarios.176  Utilizing such an approach will force courts to 
 
 172  This figure portrays all of the scenarios under Title III that implicate the two 
types of spaces—physical and virtual—that are commonly involved and the issues of 
unitary versus separate ownership and operation.  See infra notes 173–74. 
 173  Most Title III claims have involved a single entity that owns or controls a 
physical space; however, many Title III claims have also involved an entity that 
controls but does not own a physical space.  E.g., Disabled Rights Comm. v. Las Vegas 
Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2004); Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 
1063 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 174  In the Internet context, plaintiffs have used the “nexus” approach to establish 
Title III claims against an entity that owns and controls both a physical and virtual 
space (the virtual space being the retailer website which acts as another “door” to the 
store).  E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 
2006).  The question arises, however, whether the “nexus” approach can allow Title 
III to reach a separately owned or controlled virtual space that also appears to act as 
a “door” to a physical space; this is the question that this Comment considers. 
 175  Redbox may be the bridge to the “separately owned noncompliant virtual with 
compliant physical spaces” quadrant because it is a company with both a website and 
physical kiosks in places of public accommodation.  Redbox may be one step above 
Target but one step below Young.  See application of “Backdoor Nexus” approach infra 
Part IV.B.2. 
 176  The Target court found a sufficient “nexus” because the challenged service was 
heavily integrated with, and operated as a gateway to, the brick-and-mortar stores.  
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955.  But the court did not further elaborate 
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scrutinize websites with functions that are similar to target.com, even 
if such sites only have a physical presence in a separately owned 
public accommodation.177 
The second prong—”operation”—will use the specific control 
and limited occupation concepts to collectively set forth a definition 
that courts can apply to web-based companies.  This interpretation 
will dynamically reflect the commercial presence that these entities 
can have in a place of public accommodation in order to prevent 
them from having “carte blanche to discriminate against persons with 
disabilities when selling their goods and services.”178 
1.  First Prong: “Integration”179 
i.  The Target Factors as a Sliding Scale 
Courts should explicitly adopt the Target court’s examples of 
Title III-covered website functions as a checklist or sliding scale in 
order to account for the inherent variability of a totality of the 
circumstances approach.180  Each of these functions has an element of 
 
website and a public accommodation.  See id.  Moreover, it is unclear whether the 
website must act as an actual virtual door, or merely if it must have a strong 
connection to the place of public accommodation.  See supra Part II.C. 
 177  Compare Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(not considering the “nexus” argument because of the plaintiff’s failure to assert an 
argument regarding ownership, leasing, or operation, in spite of facebook.com 
having information on store locations and hours where it sells its gift cards and 
serving as the location where customers must redeem the value of store-bought gift 
cards), with Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (finding target.com—a site 
that Target indisputably owned and operated—to be sufficiently integrated with 
Target retail stores because customers could obtain store location and hours 
information, refill prescriptions, order photographs for in-store pick-up, and print 
coupons to redeem at stores). 
 178  GOREN, supra note 6, at 128.  This Comment takes the position that courts 
have not been dynamically interpreting Title III’s public-accommodations provision 
to preserve the statute’s purpose in the face of evolving technology.  See Carparts 
Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(explaining that the congressional intent is for Title III to keep the disabled in the 
“social mainstream”).  The phrase “dynamically interpreting” is not meant to indicate 
that virtual places should themselves be considered places of public accommodation, 
but rather that courts have placed so much focus on the “place” aspect of the public-
accommodation provision and not enough on the “affects commerce” aspect.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006). 
 179  This Comment’s proposed “integration” standard is equally applicable to both 
a separately owned website and a unitarily owned website.  See, e.g., Young, 790 F. 
Supp. 2d 1110; Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946. 
 180  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949.  A totality of circumstances 
approach may, like Target’s current state, lead to a continuum in which circuit courts 
must ultimately define different points; however, adding specific factors to such an 
analysis will provide a more concrete standard than the unformulated one that Target 
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“duality,” meaning that the website allows consumers to engage in 
specific actions that they can also perform in the store, or that the site 
affects the enjoyment of other goods and services of the store.181  The 
following website functions are examples of the types of dual-use 
functions that courts should consider: (1) accessing store 
information; (2) refilling a prescription or ordering photographs for 
in-store pick-up; (3) printing online coupons redeemable in the 
store; and (4) obtaining products offered both online and in the 
store.182  The Target court’s enumeration of such functions is the only 
indicator it gave of what may constitute a heavily integrated website; 
however, the court did not indicate whether any single factor is 
dispositive.183  Therefore, the more of these or other dual-natured 
functions that a website possesses, the more likely courts will view it as 
a doorway to a public accommodation.184 
ii.  Additional “Backdoor” Factors from Young 
The inquiry, however, would not end with the Target factors 
because incorporating additional factors from Young will create a 
spectrum that parallels the structure of the implicated business.185  A 
plaintiff would need to demonstrate more to establish a “nexus” when 
the litigation implicates a website of a completely virtual company 
and less when it involves a retailer-companion website—as in Target.186  
When the defendant is a web-based company with some type of 
physical presence in a place of public accommodation, courts must 
also consider the degree to which the inaccessible website affects 
enjoyment of the goods and services provided by the separately 
 
creates.  See DuPree, supra note 17, at 291. 
 181  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949. 
 182  Id.  The court found that online-only deals or products would not affect 
enjoyment of goods and services in the brick-and-mortar stores because they lack 
duality.  Id. at 956. 
 183  Id. at 949, 956. 
 184  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 185  Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see also supra 
Part II.D.  Consideration of the Target factors should be obligatory, but such factors 
have more of a preliminary value.  There are several types of business structures that 
can exist, ranging from a completely virtual—or web-based—company to a brick-and-
mortar retail outlet with a companion website.  Amazon.com is an example of a 
completely virtual company because it does not have an apparent physical presence 
in any place of public accommodation.  See AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012).  Target Corp. is an example of a retail outlet with a 
companion website.  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946.  Facebook, Inc. 
could be an example of a structure in between these set-ups because it is a web-based 
company with a presence in various retail stores. 
 186  See discussion infra Part IV. 
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owned place.  For instance, in Young, facebook.com’s inaccessibility 
completely prevented the plaintiff from using—although not from 
purchasing—the Facebook gift cards that retail stores sold.187  
Moreover, courts must consider whether purchasing the web-based 
entity’s products in a store gives a customer any type of reward points 
or store credit redeemable for the purchase of any store 
merchandise.188 
iii.  Recap of First Prong 
A court’s consideration of these factors will account for both 
companion websites—virtual front doors—and websites that create a 
virtual backdoor to a place of public accommodation.189  For the 
companion websites like target.com, a plaintiff can satisfy 
“integration” when customers can at least engage in “dual” functions 
such as: (1) accessing store information; (2) refilling a prescription 
or ordering photographs for store pick-up; (3) printing online 
coupons redeemable in the store; and (4) obtaining products offered 
both online and in the store.190  For all other websites, a plaintiff must 
establish all of these types of functions plus the Young factors, such as 
the existence of a mutually beneficial rewards program or that a 
website’s inaccessibility actually deprives a plaintiff of the ability to 
use a product or service that the company offers both on its website 
and in the store.191 
2.  Second Prong: “Operation” 
i.  Step One: Control of Heavily Integrated Inaccessible 
Websites 
Once a plaintiff establishes “integration” between a website and 
 
 187  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5; see 
supra Part II.D. 
 188  See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 189  Target.com is an example of a virtual front door because Target owns and 
operates it, and it has dual-natured functions.  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 
at 948–49.  Young presents a potential example of a virtual back door because 
Facebook, Inc. does not own a brick-and-mortar store but its website nonetheless 
prevents full and equal enjoyment of the goods that it provides through various 
stores.  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110.  A business’s structure alone should not cause 
courts to overlook the presence of the type of discrimination that Title III aims to 
prevent.  Moreover, a vital aspect of Target is the court’s explicit affirmation that Title 
III is applicable to off-site discrimination and intangible barriers that create such 
discrimination, such as a medium of communication.  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 
F. Supp. 2d at 953–55. 
 190  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949. 
 191  See Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5. 
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a place of public accommodation, the first step under the “Backdoor 
Nexus” Approach’s second prong is that the web-based company 
must itself be responsible for the wrongful conduct.  To be liable as a 
Title III operator, the company must first control (or own) an 
inaccessible website—meaning that it is a noncompliant virtual 
space.192  This step is important because the common thread in Title 
III franchising cases is determining whether a non-owning entity has 
control over the accessibility barriers to a place.193  If the plaintiff 
demonstrates that the defendant controls the website, then courts 
can extend this control to some type of control over the place 
provided that the plaintiff meets the remaining steps. 
ii.  Step Two: Commercial Presence in a Place of Public 
Accommodation 
The second and most important step is that a plaintiff must 
establish the company’s commercial presence in a separately owned 
place of public accommodation by showing that the entity is engaging 
in commerce through some aspect of the place.194  To “engage in 
commerce,” the web-based entity must provide a trademarked good 
or service in a place of public accommodation; however, the good or 
service must actually occupy a portion of the place.195 The presence 
factor will be stronger for companies like Redbox that control and 
utilize some type of physical mechanism to provide such goods and 
services in a place—like a kiosk.196 
iii.  Step Three: Prevention of Usage of Product or Service 
 
 192  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (involving a single entity 
that owns and operates both a noncompliant virtual space and a compliant physical 
space). 
 193  See supra Parts III.A.2.i–ii. 
 194  This would include a kiosk or perhaps the section where gift cards are sold.  
See discussion infra Part IV.B–C. 
 195  Web-based companies identify themselves to the public through a 
trademark—like Facebook does with its gift cards.  See supra note 102.  Moreover, 
even though “customers contract for liability on the basis of trademark, [they] 
receive liability (or fail to receive it) on the basis of entity structure.” Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1113 
(2002) (alteration in original). 
 196  See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.  Airline ticket counters are an example of a 
concrete space within a place of public accommodation.  See supra note 165.  
Moreover, kiosks themselves have been the subject of disability discrimination suits 
when they are inaccessible to blind individuals, with the argument that a kiosk is a 
“service of” a place of public accommodation.  See supra Part II.E.  For disability 
discrimination suits involving airline websites and kiosks, see, e.g., Foley v. JetBlue 
Airways, Corp., No. C 10-3882, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85426 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011). 
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Establishing Presence 
The second prong’s final step is that the website’s inaccessibility 
must either create a separate benefit for those able to use the site, or 
hinder enjoyment and use of the trademarked good or service that 
establishes the web-based entity’s commercial presence in the place 
of public accommodation.  The website’s noncompliance will be even 
stronger if the discriminatory effect on the trademarked goods or 
services reaches other services or store merchandise that other 
companies provide.197  This step is critical because the effect of the 
noncompliance must reach beyond the borders of virtual space and 
enter the physical space.198 
iv.  Recap of Second Prong 
After satisfying the “integration” prong, a plaintiff can establish a 
web-based entity’s “operation” of a place of public accommodation by 
meeting the following steps: (1) ownership or control of an 
inaccessible website; (2) existence of the web-based entity’s 
commercial presence by showing that the entity engages in 
commerce through a limited space of a place of public 
accommodation; and (3) creation of a separate benefit, for those able 
to use it, or hindrance of use or enjoyment of the trademarked 
product or service that establishes the commercial presence in a 
public accommodation. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF THE “BACKDOOR NEXUS” APPROACH 
In order to demonstrate how the “Backdoor Nexus” approach 
accounts for the interaction between physical and virtual spaces, this 
section will apply the proposed framework for “integration” and 
“operation” to Target, Young, and Redbox—an entity that may 
“bridge” the two.  This approach’s application will demonstrate how a 
plaintiff can establish “integration” for unitary ownership scenarios, 
such as retailer-companion websites or “one-step-removed” websites 
 
 197  While this element is similar to one of the Young factors, namely the rewards 
program example, it is also suitable for establishing a non-owning entity’s presence 
because of its website’s effects on unconnected products that the same store sells. 
 198  See, e.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  If 
facebook.com’s inaccessibility only hindered the ability to social network, then the 
discrimination would not be effectuated through the public accommodation.  But 
since the inaccessibility actually prevented a customer from using a gift card 
purchased at a retail store, the discrimination extends through the public 
accommodation.  The same can be said more strongly for Redbox.  See infra Part 
IV.B.2. 
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with slightly different functions than their store counterparts.199  It 
will also show how websites like Redbox and Facebook can be 
integrated with separately owned places of public accommodation.  
More importantly, the application to web-based entities with a 
commercial presence, ranging from a physical mechanism providing 
services in a limited space to a completely virtual presence, will reveal 
how courts can approach “operation.” 
A.  Target and Companion Website Scenarios 
1.  “Integration” 
Since the proposed totality of the circumstances approach is 
built around the usage of Target’s Title III-covered website functions, 
a brick-and-mortar store with a companion website should easily meet 
the proposed “integration” standards.  Apple is an example because it 
has both brick-and-mortar Apple Stores and the Apple Store 
Online.200  Apple’s website exhibits numerous “dual” functions 
because it allows customers to do the following: (1) view and 
purchase the same products in stores;201 (2) use “personal pickup” to 
order products for in-store retrieval;202 (3) access a store locator with 
hours of operation information;203 and (4) schedule in-store 
appointments with members of the Genius Bar.204 
The more that a website’s functions deviate from those of the 
store, the more factors from Target—and possibly Young—a plaintiff 
must demonstrate.  For example, Blockbuster Video, which has long 
provided its rental services through brick-and-mortar stores, has 
 
 199  See supra notes 89, 132, 137.  The Internet is dynamic and not every retailer 
website will function the same way despite a clear common ownership.  Therefore, a 
totality of circumstances approach would account for the variability in websites’ 
designs and functions. 
 200  Apple Store Online, APPLE STORE, http://store.apple.com/us (last visited Jan. 27, 
2012).  Between the online store and the countless brick-and-mortar shops around 
the world, Apple has a very pervasive presence, having even opened an elegantly 
designed Apple Store in Grand Central Station in New York.  Elizabeth Lazarowitz, 
Apple Store Opens in Grand Central, NY DAILY NEWS (Dec. 8, 2011), available at 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-12-08/news/30492743_1_apple-store 
-landmark-status-grand-central-terminal. 
 201  Apple Store Online, supra note 200. 
 202  Personal Pickup, APPLE STORE, http://www.store.apple.com/us/browse/home 
/personal_pickup (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 203  Store Locator, APPLE STORE, http://www.apple.com/retail/ (last visited Jan. 6, 
2013). 
 204  Genius Bar, APPLE STORE, http:// www.apple.com/retail/geniusbar/ (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
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added a companion website in recent years.205  But blockbuster.com 
has some functions more akin to Netflix’s DVD-by-mail service than 
to target.com.206  Even though patrons can use blockbuster.com to 
locate specific brick-and-mortar stores207 and review their video 
inventories,208 one of the website’s main purposes is to enable 
customers who subscribe to Blockbuster’s independent DVD-by-mail 
service to manage their accounts.209  The site does, however, allow 
members of the DVD-by-mail service to return movies directly to the 
brick-and-mortar store and exchange them for different ones.210  
Pursuant to Target, Title III will not cover blockbuster.com functions 
that are geared toward the DVD-by-mail service because the statute 
only applies to functions that have an effect on the enjoyment or 
usage of goods and services that the retail stores offer.211 Therefore, 
while blockbuster.com should also satisfy the “integration prong,” a 
plaintiff may need to show some more factors on the sliding scale 
because one of the website’s primary functions is to provide a DVD-
by-mail service, as opposed to acting as a door—at least a front 
door—to the brick-and-mortar stores. 
2.  “Operation” 
For companion website scenarios, the “operation” prong is not 
an issue because the retailer indisputably owns and operates such 
websites.212 
B.  Redbox Scenario 
1.  “Integration” 
Redbox, the long-time rival of rental company Netflix, is a more 
difficult scenario than Target because it involves a company that 
 
 205  BLOCKBUSTER, www.blockbuster.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). 
 206  See supra notes 89, 132.  Blockbuster now also allows for online streaming like 
Netflix.  How On Demand Works, BLOCKBUSTER, http://www.blockbuster.com 
/download/ondemand101 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 207  Find a Blockbuster Store Near You, BLOCKBUSTER, http://www.blockbuster.com 
/stores/storelocator (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 208  Check for In-Store Rental, BLOCKBUSTER, http://www.blockbuster.com/browse 
/stores/storelocator/findStoresWithTitleAvailability (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 209  How Blockbuster Online Works, BLOCKBUSTER, http://www.blockbuster.com 
/howitWorks (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 210  See id. 
 211  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006).  But see supra text accompanying note 210. 
 212  E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (“Target.com is a website 
owned and operated by Target.”); see also In-Store Coupons, supra note 90. 
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functions by means of a website and in-store interactive kiosks across 
the country, as opposed to a brick-and-mortar retailer with a 
companion website.213  Redbox.com should still pass the “integration” 
phase, however, because it allows customers to perform the following 
dual-natured functions: (1) reserve movies online for in-store kiosk 
pick-up;214 (2) find a Redbox location;215 (3) acquire promotional 
codes to use at the kiosks for free or discounted rentals;216 and (4) 
conduct inventory searches of any kiosk location.217  Therefore, the 
website is comparable to both target.com and blockbuster.com, and 
meets all of the Target factors—and more—under the “Backdoor 
Nexus” approach.218 
In addition to redbox.com’s dual-natured functions, the degree 
to which the site’s inaccessibility can affect Redbox’s services presents 
a strong case for “integration.”  Specifically, the website’s 
inaccessibility to the disabled can create a separate or unequal benefit 
in violation of Title III for those still able to access it.219  If a disabled 
individual could not access redbox.com, then that individual would 
be unable to locate the nearest kiosk or check a specific kiosk’s 
inventory without physically entering the place of public 
accommodation.220  More importantly, the disabled individual may be 
unable to rent a specific movie because another person can instantly 
reserve this movie online before the disabled individual sets foot in 
 
 213  Redbox allows consumers to select DVDs and Blu-Rays to rent both online via 
its website and offline via its kiosks.  Media Center Facts About Redbox, supra note 40.  
The kiosks are always located either inside or directly outside of—and attached to—
various supermarkets and stores, such as Shop Rite and Walgreen’s. 
 214  REDBOX, www.redbox.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 215  Find a Redbox Location, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/locations (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2012). 
 216  Help Center, REDBOX, https://redbox.custhelp.com/app/home (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2012).  Customers can also purchase “Redbox Gifts” redeemable for kiosk 
promo codes.  Redbox Makes Giving This Holiday Season Easy With New Redbox Gifts, 
REDBOX (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.redbox.com/release_20111212. 
 217  All Movies, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/movies (last visited Feb. 8, 
2012). 
 218  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006) (“Through Target.com, a customer can access information on store 
locations and hours, refill a prescription or order photo prints for pick-up at a store, 
and print coupons to redeem at a store.”); supra Part IV.A.1. 
 219  The creation of a separate or unequal benefit is one type of disability 
discrimination that Title III expressly prohibits.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii) 
(2006).  Young implicates a different type of prohibited discrimination because 
facebook.com’s inaccessibility prevents any participation or enjoyment of a particular 
good that is offered through a place of public accommodation.  Young v. Facebook, 
Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal 2011). 
 220  See supra notes 215, 217. 
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the door and approaches the kiosk.221  Therefore, although Redbox 
does not own any place of public accommodation, it should meet the 
“integration” prong because its customers can use its website to 
perform functions akin to walking through the front door of a store 
and selecting a movie directly from the kiosk.222 
Difficulty in applying “integration” may arise, however, from the 
fact that the overall functionality of redbox.com is essentially limited 
to streamlining the movie-selection process at kiosks—movies can 
only be physically obtained from the kiosks themselves.223  Even if 
customers reserve movies online, they must still swipe a credit card in 
the kiosk payment slot to commence the actual payment.224  Viewed in 
a different way, however, this fact may keep Redbox closer to Target 
because it ensures that the actual commercial transaction is occurring 
within the place of public accommodation as opposed to solely in the 
virtual space.225  Moreover, one blind advocacy group has gone a step 
further in arguing that Redbox’s kiosks are places of public 
accommodation because they are “rental establishments” under Title 
III.226  If courts accept this argument, then they could easily view 
redbox.com as a companion website to Redbox kiosks based on its 
dual functions.227  Another argument is that Redbox kiosks are a 
“service of” the sales establishments in which they reside.228  If courts 
acknowledge this argument, they could consider redbox.com to be its 
own service or a component of Redbox kiosks.229 
 
 221  Cf. Redbox Complaint, supra note 126 (alleging inaccessibility to Redbox 
kiosks themselves creates a separate benefit for those who are not blind or visually 
impaired due to the touch screen rental process of the kiosks); see also Media Center 
Facts About Redbox, supra note 40. 
 222  Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
 223  How Redbox Works, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/howitworks (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2012).  One potential twist, however, is the announcement of a joint venture 
between Redbox and Verizon to provide a future online streaming service akin to 
Netflix.  Ben Fritz, Redbox and Verizon to Create Streaming Movie Service, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/07/business 
/la-fi-ct-verizon-redbox-20120207.  Even though Verizon would be this service’s 
primary owner, this collaboration could potentially move Redbox a bit closer to 
blockbuster.com or further toward Netflix.  See id. 
 224  Media Center Facts About Redbox, supra note 40. 
 225  See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 226  Redbox Complaint, supra note 126, at 10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(e) 
(2006); supra Part II.E. 
 227  See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text. 
 228  Redbox Complaint, supra note 126, at 10. 
 229  See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
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2.  “Operation” 
An entity that is structured like Redbox may serve as the bridge 
for “operation” between Title III franchising cases and Title III 
Internet cases because its in-store interactive kiosks give it a true 
commercial presence within a place of public accommodation.  
Redbox easily meets the “operation” prong’s first step because it 
would be responsible for any wrongful conduct since it owns and/or 
controls a website that is heavily integrated with a place of public 
accommodation.230  While the second step is the most difficult,  
Redbox has a strong presence in a place of public accommodation 
because patrons access its rental services through physical 
mechanisms—the kiosks—that are located within a particular part of 
a retail store but remain under Redbox’s ownership or control.231  
Therefore, in addition to providing a trademarked service that 
physically occupies and commercially transacts with customers in a 
limited space of a retail store, Redbox also maintains control over 
that space.232  Moreover, Redbox’s kiosks have functions that 
correspond with the surrounding retail stores because both utilize a 
“self-service” model that allows customers to independently browse 
items for purchase.233  Redbox may indeed act as a bridge between 
Title III franchising and Title III Internet cases because the former 
cases characterize “operation” in the context of control over a 
physical space, and Redbox exerts a similar control through its kiosks 
that are attached to a portion of a physical space.234 
Redbox also meets the “operation” prong’s third step because 
redbox.com’s inaccessibility to the disabled directly impacts the 
trademarked service that establishes Redbox’s commercial presence 
in a place of public accommodation—the kiosks.235  Specifically, such 
inaccessibility would create an unequal or separate benefit for those 
able to access the site.  Since customers can use redbox.com to 
instantly locate and reserve a specific movie, they can complete the 
 
 230  Terms and Conditions, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/terms (last updated 
June 1, 2011) (alteration in original) (“These terms apply to Redbox.com . . . which 
is owned or controlled by Redbox Automated Retail, LLC . . . .”). 
 231  Terms and Conditions, supra note 230. 
 232  Id. 
 233  See Lieber v. Macy’s West, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 
1999)(discussing how most major retail stores generally operate via the “self-service” 
model, meaning customers are expected to obtain merchandise by independently 
browsing and/or searching through the display areas for an item that they wish to 
purchase). 
 234  See supra notes 156, 159, 165 and accompanying text. 
 235  See How Redbox Works, supra note 223. 
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rental process in just two steps: (1) touching the button “online 
rental pickup” and (2) swiping the credit card used for reservation.236  
Those who are unable to access the site, however, are at a 
disadvantage because they must use the less efficient seven-step kiosk 
process.237  More importantly, before or during the movie selection at 
a kiosk, a website user can instantly bypass the kiosk user by reserving 
the same movie at the same location.  Redbox satisfies the 
“operation” prong because it owns or controls a website that, when 
inaccessible, creates a separate benefit for those who use its services, 
which Redbox provides through a physical, commercial mechanism 
that occupies part of a retail store. 
C.  Young Scenario and Other Completely Virtual Entities 
1.  “Integration” 
Young is a much more difficult scenario than Target and Redbox 
because Facebook is a completely virtual company like Amazon.  
Facebook may, however, meet the “integration” standard because its 
website possesses some of the Target factors and additional dual-
natured functions.  Facebook.com allows users to perform the 
following functions: (1) locate a retail store that sells Facebook gift 
cards; (2) redeem the value of Facebook gift cards purchased in 
stores; and (3) purchase Facebook Credits online.238  The website only 
possesses two of the Target factors, accessing store information and 
offering the same product both online and in the store.239  Facebook 
does not strongly meet these factors, however, because it only offers 
one product, as opposed to offering multiple products online and in 
stores.240 
 
 236  Media Center Facts About Redbox, supra note 40 (alteration in original) 
(“Consumers can pick up reserved movies or games in just seconds by following these 
simple steps.”). 
 237  Customers first have to touch the button “rent a movie,” browse titles for 
selection, “add to cart,” press “check out,” swipe a card, enter the card zip code, and 
enter an e-mail address.  Id. 
 238  Facebook Credits Page, supra note 102. 
 239  See id. 
 240  Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006).  A company like Amazon may have a slightly stronger level of 
“integration” because not only does its website sell a surplus of products, but Amazon 
sells its Kindle e-readers and gift cards in various retail stores across the country.  
Participating Retailers, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?ie 
=UTF8&docId=1000465651 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).  Like Facebook gift cards, 
consumers can only use the Kindle and Amazon gift cards in conjunction with the 
company website.  Amazon.com Gift Cards, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com 
/gp/gc (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).  Moreover, Amazon has a mobile price-comparison 
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Since Facebook is a virtual entity, it needs to meet more of the 
Target factors and additional dual-natured functions to be on the 
heavily integrated side of the sliding scale.  The degree to which the 
connections between facebook.com and a place of public 
accommodation affect the enjoyment and usage of the Facebook gift 
cards is substantial.241  As alleged in Young, facebook.com’s 
inaccessibility does not merely hinder enjoyment or usage of Facebook 
gift cards—it completely prevents it.242  Those who purchase Facebook 
gift cards can only redeem the cards’ values online and, thus, the 
site’s inaccessibility results in the inability to use them.243  Moreover, 
the Best Buy rewards program creates a connection between 
purchasing Facebook gift cards and purchasing other store 
merchandise.244  If facebook.com denies access to a disabled 
individual, then that individual is much less likely to purchase 
Facebook gift cards and, thus, does not acquire reward gift 
certificates to purchase any other Best Buy products.245  Therefore, 
while facebook.com could potentially meet the “integration” prong, 
the “integration” is not as strong as retailer-companion sites and 
redbox.com, both of which meet most of the Target and additional 
dual-natured functions. 
2.  “Operation” 
Even if facebook.com meets the “integration” prong, it is 
unlikely that Facebook will satisfy the “operation” prong because its 
commercial presence is weak at best.246  Facebook satisfies the 
“operation” prong’s first step because it owns and controls a website 
that, if inaccessible, is integrated with the retail stores that provide its 
gift cards for purchase.247  While Facebook provides a trademarked 
 
application that, while meant to work in competition with retailers, is an extension of 
its website that customers can use in physical stores.  Shan Li, Furor Surrounds 
Amazon’s Price-Comparison App, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/09/business/la-fi-amazon-app-20111210.  If 
retailers participated in Amazon’s price-comparison application, as opposed to 
competing with Amazon, in order to offer customers the lowest prices, then perhaps 
this could be indicative of both “integration” and presence. 
 241  See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see 
also Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 7. 
 242  Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5. 
 243  Id. 
 244  Id. 
 245  See id. 
 246  Cf. discussion of Redbox “operation” supra Part IV.B.2; see also supra Part 
III.B.2.ii. 
 247  Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113–15 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
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good through a place of public accommodation, the second step will 
be very difficult because the company does not use any type of 
physical mechanism, like a kiosk, to provide its goods.248  Even if 
courts are willing to view the aisles or shelves that contain Facebook’s 
gift cards as physical mechanisms, Facebook does not control such 
spaces like Redbox controls its kiosks.249  Facebook does have some 
presence in the retail stores that sell its gift cards, such as its 
advertising and promotion and its participation in the Best Buy 
rewards program.250  But this presence is much weaker, and therefore 
insufficient under the second prong, than other web-based 
companies like Redbox that have a physical commercial presence. 
If Facebook had a strong enough presence to satisfy the second 
step, it would meet the third step because facebook.com’s 
inaccessibility would completely prevent use of the trademarked good 
that established its commercial presence—Facebook gift cards.251  
Moreover, the discriminatory effect on the Facebook gift cards would 
reach other store merchandise because of Facebook’s participation in 
the Best Buy rewards program, even creating an unequal benefit for 
those able to redeem the value of such cards.252 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The recent history of website litigation demonstrates the need 
for a new theory to reconcile Title III, and in particular the “nexus” 
approach, with the modern reality of places of public 
accommodation.  Even though Target was only a district court case, it 
became a catalyst for a whole new class of Title III suits, especially in 
the Northern District of California.253  The year 2011 was the first 
significant period for Title III website litigation since National 
Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp. extended application of the 
“nexus” approach to websites.  It was a year ripe for revisiting the 
issue of Title III’s applicability to the Internet and strengthening the 
“nexus” approach because several major web-based companies like 
 
 248  See Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5. 
 249  See Terms and Conditions, supra note 230. 
 250  See Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 6 (“Defendant advertises and 
promotes Facebook, Inc. with InComm, Zynga and Facebook Applications at physical 
brick and mortar stores.”). 
 251  See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
 252  The ability to redeem the value of Facebook gift cards may create a separate or 
unequal benefit because website users are more likely to buy the gift cards and earn 
reward points to purchase other merchandise.  See Amended Complaint, supra note 
31, at 5; Best Buy Reward Zone, supra note 105. 
 253  See BALLON, supra note 21. 
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Facebook, Netflix, and Redbox were sued under Title III of the 
ADA.254  But instead, the courts denied relief to another disabled 
individual despite the presence of a “nexus” argument reminiscent of 
that in Target.255 
This Comment utilizes the 2011 Young v. Facebook, Inc. decision 
and the 2012 suit against Redbox as examples of a potentially 
recurring scenario that courts will face in future Title III litigation.  
Courts will undoubtedly continue to face arguments from plaintiffs 
who are seeking to establish a “nexus” between a noncompliant 
virtual space that is heavily integrated with a separately owned 
compliant physical space.256  The “Backdoor Nexus” approach 
demonstrates a potential solution that may move courts one step 
closer to implementing their “judicial willingness” to bring websites 
within Title III’s coverage.257 
This method calls for courts to implement a two prong 
framework for assessing “integration” between websites and places of 
public accommodation, and a web-based entity’s potential 
“operation” of such places.  The first prong, focusing on 
“integration,” is a totality of circumstances approach that consists of 
Target’s Title III-covered website functions and additional dual-
natured factors from Young.  The more dual-natured functions that a 
website possesses, the more likely courts will view it on the sliding 
scale as a doorway to a place of public accommodation.  The second 
prong, “operation,” consists of three steps that assess whether a web-
based entity: (1) has control or ownership of an inaccessible website; 
(2) provides goods or services through a limited space of a place of 
public accommodation; and (3) has an inaccessible website that 
creates a separate benefit or hinders enjoyment of the good or service 
that establishes its commercial presence in a place of public 
accommodation. 
Recent Title III suits against major web-based companies like 
Netflix and Redbox suggest the types of Title III cases that are on the 
horizon.258  With a methodical approach like the one this Comment 
proposes, courts can subject retailer-companion websites like that in 
Target or Apple to Title III liability for ADA noncompliance.  
 
 254  See Baynes, supra note 95. 
 255  See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110. 
 256  See, e.g., Redbox Complaint, supra note 126. 
 257  See DuPree, supra note 17, at 290–91. 
 258  The Title III litigation involving Netflix is still underway.  See supra note 95.  
Moreover, Redbox is the example of what is to come because it is a company with a 
website and a physical kiosk that occupies a limited space within a statutorily 
accepted place of public accommodation.  See Redbox Complaint, supra note 126. 
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Moreover, Title III will cover noncompliant web-based companies like 
Redbox that do not own a place of public accommodation but have a 
physical presence in such places.  The liability of completely virtual 
entities like Amazon is still difficult to assess, but the “Backdoor 
Nexus” approach accounts for these entities while ensuring that the 
“nexus” approach remains contoured to commerce that is engaged in 
through a place of public accommodation.  Although the “Backdoor 
Nexus” approach ultimately does not remedy the injustice of Young, 
this is not an indicator that Congress did not intend for Title III to 
reach completely virtual entities.  This approach is aimed at 
addressing the extent to which Target can accommodate situations 
where the disabled cannot enter a physical space’s “doors.”259  In 
order to determine whether Title III can cover Facebook, courts will 
need to reach even further into the virtual world and reinterpret the 
public-accommodation provision by addressing the issue that this 
Comment has excluded—the Internet itself as a place of public 
accommodation.260 
The “Backdoor Nexus” approach will ultimately help courts 
finally recognize the unique and evolving nature of the Internet and 
the types of discrimination it may create in a place of public 
accommodation.  The word “place” is a “term of art” and warrants the 
application of different theories that reflect the nature of its doors—
whether physical, virtual, front, or back.261  Until courts resume their 
role as gatekeeper, plaintiffs will be at a disadvantage—not because of 






 259  This objective is in line with Title III’s purpose to ensure access to places of 
public accommodation.  Colker, supra note 5, at 402. 
 260  See supra notes 17, 18 and accompanying text.  The United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts has taken one of the most recent steps toward 
addressing this issue by finding that Netflix’s “Watch Instantly” video–streaming 
website itself is a Title III place of public accommodation, applicable under the 
statutory categories of either service establishments, places of entertainment, or 
rental establishments.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-CV-30168, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84518, at *9 (D. Mass. June 19, 2012). 
 261  See GLYNN, ANROW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 39, at 509. 
